MIDDLE EAST CONTEMPORARY SURVEY

Volume XVI

1992

AMI AYALON
Editor

Barbara Newson, Executive Editor

The Moshe Dayan Center
for Middle Eastern and African Studies
The Shiloah Institute
Tel Aviv University

Westview Press
BOULDER, SAN FRANCISCO, & OXFORD

The Global Village of Islam

MARTIN KRAMER

Did national borders contain the revival of Islam? In one view, there was no international Islamic network. There existed only solitary states and movements, each struggling independently to define Islam. Edward Djerejian, US assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, made this argument in the very first US policy statement on Islam in May:

> In countries throughout the Middle East and North Africa, we thus see groups or movements seeking to reform their societies in keeping with Islamic ideals. There is considerable diversity in how these ideals are expressed. We detect no monolithic or coordinated international effort behind these movements. What we do see are believers living in different countries placing renewed emphasis on Islamic principles, and governments accommodating Islamist political activity to varying degrees and in different ways.[1]

But did this judgment reflect a failure to detect an international Islam, not its absence? Sudan's Hasan al-Turabi, the most visible Islamist leader, always spoke of an "international Islamic movement," which he described in these terms:

> Internationalism does not need an organic link that violates laws. ...The Islamic movement can adopt the same forms and the same ideologies in each country and appear as if it were one movement, without continuous membership or being organized under a single main, world leadership. Of course, when observers see a uniting of forms of Islamic experience, they necessarily attribute that to a single plot, which is based on a person or persons who control all the reins of the plot. However, this unity and all these reins are in God's hands, who dispenses Islamic power in various parts of the world. The underlying cause of unity is unity of God and the unity of the path, and not unity of organization.[2]

Two events during the year raised the question of "unity" in an urgent manner. First, the January crisis in Algeria sent shock waves throughout the world of Islamic activism. The Algerian military, in order to forestall an election victory by the Islamic movement, cracked down relentlessly on the Islamists. In the aftermath, a growing body of evidence pointed to ties of solidarity that bound the Algerian movement to similar movements, although their significance defied easy interpretation. Then Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence in April, upon the final disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. The first Muslim state in Europe quickly came under siege by Serb and Croat forces, and the videotapes of atrocities against Muslims deeply moved Islamic opinion.

Both Algeria and Bosnia posed a difficult question: had Islam become a true global village, where anger at events in places as distant as Algiers and Sarajevo could stir

Copyrighted material

Muslims to combined action? Or did Islam remain a divided and inchoate world, whose disparate parts were more closely tied to the West than to one another? The year provided no answers, even as it generated much fuel for the debate.

THE CRISIS OF ISLAMIC OPPOSITION

As the year opened, Islamic opposition movements across the Arab world believed they stood on the verge of a breakthrough in their pursuit of power, after one of these movements won an election: Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front, known by its French acronym, FIS. On 26 December 1991, the FIS swept the first round of the two-round elections for Algeria's parliament, assuring the party's capture of Algeria's parliament. This would have been the culmination of the strategy adopted by several Islamic movements over the past several years, of transforming themselves into political parties to take advantage of liberalization.

The FIS victory would have been sealed in the second round of the elections, scheduled for 16 January 1992. But the Algerian military and key figures in the Algerian Government did not wait for the final verdict of the electorate: on 11 January, they staged a coup, invalidating the earlier election results. In subsequent weeks, thousands of FIS members were arrested, and the government dissolved the FIS in April. These events left Algeria, both state and society, under virtual siege, and the casualties of the resulting violence mounted rapidly during the year.

Islamic movements elsewhere had basked in the first-round success of the FIS, seeing it as a harbinger of victories to come. The guide of the Egyptian Muslim Brethren, Muhammad Hamid Abu al-Nasr, sent a congratulatory message to FIS leader 'Abbasi Madani (imprisoned since June 1991), describing the Algerian elections as "a good omen that speeds the victory of the Islamic movement in all our beloved Islamic countries."[3] Hasan al-Turabi, leader of Sudan's Islamic movement, waxed more enthusiastic still. In an interview granted just before the coup, Turabi saw Algeria as confirmation of the inexorable advance of Islam. It had begun in Asia (Iran), then spread to Africa (Sudan), and had reached the gates of Europe (Algeria). Turabi now pointed to the next target: "If the [ruling Algerian] National Liberation Front, with all its glorious anticolonial record, was unable to stand the wave of Islamic revivalism, then what about these regimes in Arabia which neither have an impressive record in patriotic struggle or Jihad, nor have they employed their wealth to the benefit of their people?"[4]

The coup deflated all these Islamist expectations. In a typical response, Egypt's Muslim Brethren issued a statement condemning the coup as an affront to all Islam: "We strongly denounce this conspiracy and treason against the Algerian people, indeed against Islam and Islamic nations in general."[5] Islamic movements everywhere issued similar condemnations and expressed comparable disappointment. At the same time, however, the Algerian coup boosted the morale of regimes that faced Islamic oppositions. Egypt's President Husni Mubarak said he wished the Algerian leadership luck "in overcoming this delicate situation."[6] Tunisia's President Zayn al-'Abidin Ben 'Ali quickly congratulated the coup's point man, Muhammad Boudiaf, and reaffirmed his "total solidarity" with the Algerian Government.[7] Algeria emboldened both these leaders to take still stronger measures against their own Islamists. As the year unfolded, it seemed as though the Algerian coup had restored the initiative to regimes, leaving their Islamic oppositions confused and bewildered.

Copyrighted material

Where had they gone wrong? Some Islamists began to realize the gravity of their failure to cultivate Western public opinion. During the previous year, these same Islamic movements had attacked the West for its "Crusade" against Iraq's Saddam Husayn, and denounced Saudi Arabia for reliance upon the unbelievers. But now the Islamists realized that only the West could save them from Algerian-style suppression by their regimes. The West, which accepted the Algerian coup with silent relief, would never abandon its support for entrenched rulers if the Islamists continued to demonize the West and avoid explicit commitments to democracy. During the rest of the year, the more thoughtful Islamists began a campaign to improve their image in the West, aided by Western democracy theorists and fellow travelers.

One prime figure in this campaign was the leader of the Tunisian movement, Rashid al-Ghannushi. Under his unsteady guidance, his movement, al-Nahda, had committed many errors of estimation, leaving the movement's leaders either in jail or in exile. Ghannushi himself took refuge in Britain, but many Tunisian Islamists had based themselves in Algeria, where they cooperated closely with the FIS. The Tunisian movement assumed that the FIS would at least share power in Algeria, making Algeria the most obvious place for mounting a challenge to the Tunisian regime. But the Algerian coup turned everything upside-down; as one observer put it, the FIS "was not just playing with its own fate, and the fate of Algeria, but also with the destiny of Ghannushi and his movement."[8] The mercurial Ghannushi, who had been the most vocal Islamist critic of the West during the Gulf War, now became the most vocal advocate of Islamist dialogue with the West. The suddenness of this transformation was not lost upon more critical observers in the US State Department, who refused to issue him an American visa.

Turabi, schooled in law at the University of London and the Sorbonne, also saw the importance of cultivating the West. After the Algerian coup, he did get visas, making visits to the US, Canada and Britain. There he tried to put the best face (or mask) on the Islamic movement — one that would resemble Eastern Europe's democracy movements. Turabi even had a (low-level) reception at the State Department, and testified before a US congressional committee. Turabi gained a hearing because he represented more than Sudan. He had become an icon of Islamism. This became evident in May, when he was attacked in an Ottowa airport by a Sudanese opposition-ist. Islamic activists worldwide issued a statement condemning the attack, and the impressive list of signatories demonstrated the extent of his hold over Islamist intellectuals, for whom he represented the highest exponent of their vision.[9] But Turabi had a serious credibility problem in the West, due to Sudan's appalling human rights record, which Turabi regularly attempted to paper over. One American jour-nalist succinctly described him as "the Svengali of the Islamic movement."[10] (On Sudan's Islamic role, see below.)

Among themselves, the Islamists remained true to their traditional line. Many of their leaders met to regroup at a conference held in Lahore, Pakistan, from 7–8 February. The gathering was convened by the Pakistani Jama'at-e Islami to mark 50 years since its founding, and was attended by representatives of all the major Sunni Islamist movements of the Muslim Brethren variety. Here there were no compromises: the participants expressed solidarity with the Muslims of Kashmir, the Mujahidin in Afghanistan, and the Islamic resistance in the Palestinian uprising. The Islamic nation, they announced, "would never accept, however long may be the struggle, any

Copyrighted material

solution which does not result in restoration of complete sovereignty of the Muslims over Jerusalem and Palestine." The participants called the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait "an act of aggression," and urged Iraq to release all Kuwaiti prisoners, stop the blockade of Kurdish areas and give the Kurds autonomy. But the conference also denounced the postwar *pax Americana,* and called upon Arab and Muslim countries to lift all sanctions against Iraq. The conference also supported Algeria's Islamists, and protested "repressive measures against Islamic movements and their workers in particular." They called for the imposition of Islamic law, the Shari'a, "as the supreme law of Muslim lands," and noted "with satisfaction" the efforts toward establishing an Islamic state and society in Sudan: "The conference urges all Muslim organizations and governments to extend their fullest and sustained support and cooperation to the people of Sudan in this effort, which is bound to take some time to materialize."[11] In Lahore, on the other side of the globe from Washington, the Islamists could speak their minds freely, and they obviously had not changed them.

THE AFGHAN WAR VETERANS

Pakistan had significance for an even more radical network of Muslim activists. It was the meeting place of Arabs who had volunteered for the Islamic struggle against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the 1980s and early 1990s. Their numbers had never been great. According to the Pakistani Home Ministry, 6,170 Arabs had entered the country since 1987, but it conceded that many Arabs who came to Pakistan never registered with the government, and never renewed or even obtained visas.[12] An Islamist source estimated that 10,000 Arab volunteers had come to Pakistan to join the Jihad. They had only one regular camp, near Peshawar, established in 1987 by Shaykh 'Abdallah 'Azzam, a Jordanian-born Palestinian who ran the largest recruiting operation. This camp reportedly ran four courses a year, each lasting about one month, for about 100 Arab volunteers.[13] 'Azzam was "martyred" in 1989 by assassins, and was succeeded by Shaykh Muhammad Yusuf 'Abbas.[14]

Yet despite their small numbers, these Arab volunteers created a disciplined and inspired network of activism. In the words of one Pakistani scholar who was close to 'Azzam, he was "a kind of rallying point for the youth in the Arab world — they went through him to the Jihad."[15] The Pakistani general who, from 1987–89, headed Pakistan's Interservice Intelligence, which funneled funds to Afghan guerrillas, described the Afghan Jihad as "the 'International' of the Muslim world," which "became an ideological obsession among Islamic youth who were studying in the United States and Europe. They had liberal ideas, but they saw that Western liberalism was not the answer for what they were looking for. They tried to discover themselves. The instrument for discovery was the Jihad."[16]

By 1992, the Soviets had withdrawn from Afghanistan, leaving the Mujahidin factions to fight over the spoils. The Arab volunteers began to return home, where they became involved in violent opposition to their own governments. Their numbers were not large, but numbers could deceive, as the comparison with Iran's revolution suggested. In 1975, on the eve of Iran's revolution, there were only 10,350 theological students in all of Iran, 6,500 of them in Qom.[17] The theological students in Iraq's shrine cities, including Najaf, numbered a few thousand at most. Yet the fervor of these few thousands of men made a revolution in Iran, and created a Shi'i network spread throughout the ME, which for a time challenged the stability of several

Copyrighted material

regimes. What Qom and Najaf had been to the Shi'i radicalism of the 1980s, Peshawar may have been for the Sunni radicalism of the 1990s. The impact of the Afghan veterans was felt most acutely in Algeria and Egypt.

Algeria

According to the Pakistani consulate in Algiers, Pakistan had issued 2,800 visas to young Algerians who went to fight in Afghanistan over the previous decade. Many of these came via Saudi Arabia, while others infiltrated from Iran. They reportedly suffered heavy losses in the war, but half of them came home discreetly, to arrange for more young recruits.[18] In June 1991, during the general strike, these "Afghans" reportedly marched in closed ranks, chanting "Islamic state!" and confronting police with Molotov cocktails and sometimes firearms. To differentiate themselves from other Islamist groups, they reportedly painted their eyes with kohl and covered their heads with a black fez as a reminder of the black standard of Quraysh.[19] Many of them also opposed Algeria's parliamentary elections, and after the coup they became famous for their attacks on Algerian gendarmerie posts.[20] Qamar al-Din Kherbane, a close associate of FIS leader 'Abbasi Madani who had traveled to Afghanistan several times between 1988 and 1991, said that the so-called "Afghans" were a fabrication of Algerian military security.[21] But the Algerian authorities thought otherwise, and even approached Saudi Arabia for computer records of Algerians who had gone on pilgrimage to Mecca, where they had been recruited for the Afghan War by Saudi intelligence.[22]

Egypt

The Egyptian Interior Ministry also reportedly compiled a list of c. 1,000 young Egyptians who had traveled — legally or otherwise — to Afghanistan, via either Pakistan or Iran. One group, which had departed legally, was composed of about 300 doctors. They had been sent by the Egyptian Medical Syndicate, a cooperative board controlled by the Muslim Brethren, to treat the war-wounded. Another 47 doctors arrived by other means, under the auspices of more radical groups. The second group was composed of radical Islamists fleeing from arrest in Egypt. They often departed illegally via Sudan; according to Egyptian sources, there were three training camps in Sudan, which served as way stations to Afghanistan.[23] (On Sudan's role, see below.)

Many of the leaders of two groups, Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group (*al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya*), had taken up residence in Peshawar, including the brother of Anwar al-Sadat's assassin. This led to frequent speculation that the acts of violence perpetrated by these groups in Egypt had been planned or ordered from Peshawar. Yet a former Egyptian interior minister, speaking of the Egyptians in Peshawar, gave a contrary view: "I doubt that they have any major role in domestic activity."[24] Afghan foreign minister Hidayat Amin Arsala explained Afghan policy on the Egyptians (and others): "So far I have not been given any evidence that these people have acted outside Afghanistan or have given instructions to those outside Afghanistan. If in time it becomes a problem with countries in the Islamic world like Egypt, we will have to consider what we will do."[25] But some of these Egyptians returned home during the year, strengthening the more radical groups. As the military leader of Islamic Jihad put it: "The return of our brethren who traveled to Afghanistan to assist their brethren there will be a strike force for us in our confrontation with the regime in Egypt."[26] (On

Copyrighted material

the confrontation between Islamists and the regime, see the chapter on Egypt.)

The search for a Sunni "Islamintern," and Egypt's place in it, was unlikely to turn up anything that could be summarized on an organizational chart. The transnational funding of these movements, and smaller associations, was ultimately impossible to trace through a maze of loose and ever-changing connections. Charitable donations knew no borders, and the networks often disintegrated in attempts by states to unravel them.[27] Yet the career of one man exemplified the wired world of Islamic activism, and its connections to Egypt. This was the case of Shaykh 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman, the leader (*amir*) of the Islamic Group in Egypt, who would become famous in 1993 for the spiritual authority he allegedly exercised over the bombers of the World Trade Center in New York. (The bombing, conspiracy and trials in New York will be assessed in *MECS* 1993. For his alleged involvement in the assassination of Faraj Fuda and attacks on tourists in Egypt, see chapter on Egypt.)

'Abd al-Rahman began his wanderings in 1977, when he left Egypt for a three-year stay in Saudi Arabia. There he came into contact with Sudan's Turabi and Jihad recruiter 'Azzam, and also established ties with the Saudi Muslim World League (see below). In 1980, he returned to Egypt. He attended Islamic conferences in the US in 1986 and 1987, both times preceded by visits to Saudi Arabia. Working with the Muslim World League, he preached several times in Peshawar, especially after 1988, when he became deeply involved in the recruitment effort. Two of his own sons fought in the Afghan War. He came to Sudan in 1990, visited Peshawar again that year, and finally arrived in New York later that year.[28] 'Abd al-Rahman personified the wired network of Islamic activism, linking Cairo with Peshawar, Khartoum, and ultimately New York. It would come under intense scrutiny only in 1993, when its violence finally descended on the West.

THE ROLE OF SUDAN

The year also brought renewed attention to the role of Sudan as a fulcrum for Islamist activities region-wide. (For background, see *MECS* 1991, pp. 182–85.) Sudan did not provide much of a base for influencing the ME. The country had few resources, and its economic growth had been low or negative for years. Per capita income hovered between $300 and $400, life expectancy at birth was only 51 years, and literacy was only 39% for men, 10% for women. Of 25m. inhabitants, 4m. were threatened by famine and 6m.–7m. by food shortages, largely in the south, where the Sudanese army waged a war against non-Muslim, non-Arab separatists. As a result of the war, the ratio of military to health and education expenditures stood at around 160%. Sudan also struggled under massive trade deficits and an external debt of $15bn. "At the present rate of reimbursement," observed one economist, "Sudan will not be able to pay off all its debt before the end of the 23rd century, even if it borrows nothing more between now and then." The country had no currency reserves, little prospect of additional loans, and triple-digit inflation.[29] (For more on the economic situation, see chapter on Sudan.)

Hasan al-Turabi, Sudan's éminence grise and confidant of the country's ruler, Gen. 'Umar Hasan al-Bashir, put it succinctly: "Sudan neither possesses the military capabilities that could enable it to export Islam by conquest, nor the financial capabilities that could enable it to support Islam's movement internationally. If

Copyrighted material

Sudan had the financial capabilities to build cultural centers and mosques, it would have done what the other Arab countries are doing." Sudan did not have a surplus of funds to finance even ritual Islam, let alone political Islam. At most, it could provide a model.[30] Once asked if Sudan helped Islamic parties, especially in North Africa, Turabi replied: "Absolutely. But we cannot give them financial help. If we went to the Bank of Sudan this morning I do not think there would be $5m. in the coffers. The country is very poor. We can therefore only export one thing: our experience." Turabi admitted that Sudan "is not known in history as a great Muslim country." But it had always been able to resist imperialist domination, a fact that impressed the Muslim world. "They are interested in the Sudanese model," he concluded, "even if our experiment is not complete."[31]

For some Islamists, Sudan did provide a model. Shaykh 'Abd al-Majid al-Zandani, a leader of the Islamic movement in Yemen, visited Sudan and testified to the impression left upon him:

> Three years ago the people of Sudan were afraid of their enemies, were hungry due to lack of food, and were opposed to the application of Islamic law. A new word then appeared, applying Islamic law in obedience to God. Consequently, God changed the state of fear to one of security, and He nourished their hunger. Thus the country that had implored the world powers for food and assistance against its adversary is today exporting food and pursuing its adversary to the limits of its borders — all within a span of just three years. This example deserves scrutiny by all Arabs and Muslims, because the Arabs have strayed in pursuit of imported solutions and theories.[32]

But not everyone admired Sudan's form of Islamic dictatorship. The deputy guide of the Egyptian Muslim Brethren, Mustafa Mashhur, announced that "we have a disagreement with Turabi. He is a man who cares about the masses more than educating and preparing individuals. He wants to obtain power quickly." This pursuit of power in Sudan had led him away from democracy. "We rejected this and said there is an Islamic way that requires the existence of parties and newspapers and other things." In contrast, Mashshur described the Egyptian Muslim Brethren as "moderate." They "believe in patience and gradual change, not the way of military coups, the use of force, inciting the masses, or populist ideas." The objective was "to rise to power gradually, after 15 years at least." The Sudanese Islamists, continued Mashhur, also backed Iraq in the Gulf War, whereas "we were against the positions of Sudan, Yemen and Jordan." For Mashhur, Sudan represented not a model but an experiment gone awry, in need of Egyptian advice: "We, then, do not support [Turabi and his followers] completely, nor are we against them, but we advise and warn against any excess or contravention of Islamic law."[33]

Turabi, for his part, did not hesitate to pass judgment on other Islamic movements. The leaders of Algeria's FIS, he said later in the year, "did not have a program. The FIS did not represent a real alternative." Its vision of society was founded on "moral concepts which are often repressive, especially toward women." He thought more of Tunisia's Ghannushi, "a man who is a little more liberal than most of the Islamic leaders in other Arab countries. I met him and other leaders of the movement. They are men of dialogue. They can be trusted to draw up a program for Tunisia."[34] Whether Turabi himself could be trusted was an issue in the West, but not among

Copyrighted material

most Islamists, for whom he represented a symbol of Islamism's intellectual prowess.

Turabi had created an organization to promote his vision of Islam, the Islamic Arab Popular Conference, first convened in 1991 (see *MECS* 1991, pp. 182–83). Turabi asserted that it had been established in order to confront the new world order. But after the formation of the conference, it had been subjected "to a counterattack from the world order itself, which does not want Muslims to form a front. It wants to deal with them bit by bit, and eliminate them one after the other." Turabi promised that the conference would continue to exist, "particularly since there is a need for a meeting of popular Islamic forces, today represented by dozens of conferences that are being convened in other countries. Meetings were held in Iran, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. This is proof that the Islamic world is looking for a pulpit that will unite it."[35] But Turabi admitted that "reaction to the conference compelled it to somewhat limit its activity. Nevertheless, we hope the conference will resume its activity and revive to represent the Islamic nation's consensus."[36] The organization issued the occasional statement, such as one condemning the nullification of Algeria's election results.[37] But it convened no gatherings, suggesting that Turabi was concerned lest Sudan become dangerously identified in the West as the axis of Islamic radicalism.

At the same time, however, Turabi continued to criticize the Jidda-based Islamic Conference Organization (ICO; on its activities, see section on Bosnia below). He called the ICO "nothing more than a symbol," and a "stage which exposes the nation's shortcomings." "If it were any good," he added, "we would not have tried to create a popular unofficial Islamic conference to make up for the lack of Islamic unity."[38] As it happened, the annual ICO foreign ministers' conference had been scheduled for December in Khartoum. On 24 September, in a move meant to punish Sudan, the ICO secretariat-general announced that the foreign ministers' conference would be postponed and moved. It would meet in April 1993 in Islamabad; in the meantime, the ICO would convene a meeting of ICO representatives at the annual UN General Assembly meeting in New York. Turabi, despite all his criticism, wished the ICO to convene in Khartoum, and he called the ICO's decision "queer behavior." Sudan's foreign minister blamed Saudi Arabia, warning that the ICO "does not speak for any particular state, king or sultan." He then announced that Sudan had suspended its membership in the ICO.[39] Sudan's finance minister also complained that the ICO's subsidiary, the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), withheld funds from Sudan because of its support of Iraq, by requiring that other Arab states guarantee credits.[40] This contributed still further to the image of Sudan as a pariah state.

This was precisely the image conveyed by numerous reports, especially in the Egyptian press, which spoke of training bases for foreign Islamists in Sudan. These bases reportedly dated back to 1989, but had been shifted on several occasions, from remote locales to farms near the capital, and finally to military zones and the Red Sea mountain areas. At first, they had funneled Arab volunteers to Afghanistan; now they were reportedly taking them back. A key figure in the operation was said to be 'Usama Ibn Ladin, a wealthy Saudi contractor who used to recruit young Arabs for the Afghan War. The Saudi authorities issued his recruits with passports and brought them by sundry ways to Pakistan. After the Afghan War, Ibn Ladin moved his offices and residence to Khartoum, where he supervised a number of investment projects, including a highway, an airport and a bank. He was named in the press as an instrumental figure in financing the return of Afghan veterans via Sudan, where they allegedly received further training.[41]

Copyrighted material

Sudan denied the presence of large number of foreign Islamists. Turabi admitted that Sudan took in 200 Palestinians "expelled from the Gulf," and "less than 100" Tunisians. There were no Algerians or Egyptians.[42] As for returning Afghan war veterans, Turabi offered more denials: "I would have known if many people were thrown out of Pakistan and they took refuge here in Sudan. I'm not saying that not a single person came in. But I'm quite sure that not two dozen ex-Afghan Mujahidin who are not Sudanese have come back to Sudan."[43] As for training bases, these did not exist, according to Bashir: "We are prepared to take anyone who accuses us of training fundamentalists to the bases that he says we use for that purpose to see for himself that these allegations are false."[44] But one Western government said its representatives had not been allowed to visit a farm south of Khartoum, where a group of Palestinians were reportedly living.[45]

Islamic movements did maintain offices in Khartoum. The Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine and the Palestinian Hamas both had offices in the Sudanese capital. According to the Hamas representative, "we are here in Sudan to make our work because the question of Palestine concerns not only the Palestinians. It concerns all Muslims."[46] During the year, Sudan sponsored an "Islamic Resistance Week," which was attended by a Hizballah delegation from Lebanon led by Shaykh 'Ali Taha, and they met with Turabi.[47]

What was the true extent of Sudanese support for foreign Islamists? The truth remained obscure. Turabi told an Iranian newspaper that "Sudan is hosting many Muslims, and just as Iran is accused of terrorism, so is Sudan." But Turabi did not boast too audibly: "We do not want to give the West an opportunity to spread such propaganda about us," he added, and so "we do not announce measures we have taken, because enemies might capitalize on them."[48] This left the distinct possibility that Turabi was following a deliberate policy of dissimulation — and that the charges of Sudanese harboring of Islamist subversives might not be so far-fetched after all.

Sudan's relations with Iran remained a subject of intense speculation (see *MECS* 1990, pp. 643–44; 1991, p. 184). Egyptian and Saudi press sources carried many reports of Iranian officers and troops in Sudan, with figures rising into the thousands.[49] US officials took a more realistic view, and estimated the number of Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Sudan at several hundred.[50] The West also took special note of three events: a secret visit by Revolutionary Guards' commander Mohsen Reza'i to Sudan in March, which included a meeting with the Sudanese armed forces' general staff; the visit of a high-level Sudanese military delegation to Tehran over the summer; and the appointment during the year of Majid Kamal as Iranian ambassador to Khartoum. Kamal had been involved in the takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979, and served as Iranian chargé in Beirut during the 1980s, where he was closely involved in the activities of Hizballah.[51]

Turabi admitted the presence of 200 Iranians in Sudan, but he claimed that none were military advisers.[52] Still, the above-board assistance from Iran usually had military applications for the war in the south. Iran's Reconstruction Jihad was building a "peace highway" to link Kusti, Malakal and Juba — a road reaching deep into the south, with obvious military importance.[53] Iran also opened a hospital in Khartoum.[54] Sudan's foreign minister noted these areas of cooperation with Iran, and also confirmed that Iran was providing weapons for the Sudanese army's war in the south. "We will accept help from any country which is ready to help us," he explained.[55]

Copyrighted material

Turabi said the Iranians did not give weapons, but sold them, and Bashir said there was no importation of heavy arms from Iran.[56] Bashir called this form of military cooperation "normal."[57] But it continued to give rise to apprehension in the West.

To counter this apprehension, Sudan's foreign minister pointed out that Iran and Sudan did not see eye-to-eye on major policy issues. Iran opposed the Arab-Israeli peace talks and strongly supported the sanctions against Iraq. Sudan, in contrast, supported the Arab-Israeli peace talks ("although we are not enthusiastic about them"), and opposed continuing sanctions against Iraq.[58] But there was enough common ground between the two states to make them natural allies, in a ME aligned increasingly around rival interpretations of Islam.

IRAN'S ECUMENICAL ISLAM

During 1992, Iran increasingly shifted the emphasis of its Islamic appeal to the Sunni Muslim world. Throughout the region, Shi'i movements had been checked, with the sole exception of Lebanon's Hizballah (see below). But Sunni movements seemed to have more potential, and Iran sought to influence them. To do so, however, Iran had to shed the image of a sectarian revolution.

Iran took an important step in that direction in 1992, by extending its support to the Algerian movement. The Iranian media condemned the invalidation of the Algerian elections in January, and called upon the Algerian Government to abstain from the use of force. Iranian "Leader" 'Ali Khamene'i, President 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, and the Iranian Majlis followed suit.[59] This was an important gesture. Iran had earned the enmity of the Muslim Brethren back in 1982, when it had backed the Syrian regime against an uprising of the Muslim Brethren there. Iran's choice at that time had driven a wedge between the Shi'i Islamic state and the Sunni Islamic movements. Iran's backing of the Algerian movement in its moment of crisis now restored Iran's credibility in some Sunni Islamist eyes.

Algeria had mediated between Iran and the US throughout the 1980s, and now denounced Iran for this ingratitude. "Algeria has made Iranian interests in the US its own," complained Algeria's foreign minister, Lakhdar Brahimi. "At one point the Algerian ambassador to the US spent more time working for Iran than for Algeria." He warned that if Iran did not back down from its statements in support of the FIS, Algeria's ambassador would be withdrawn.[60] One Algerian newspaper described the FIS as "an instrument of destabilization for the benefit of a foreign country or countries," a veiled reference to Iran.[61] As Iran continued its pro-FIS propaganda, Algeria recalled its ambassador from Tehran, then expelled Iran's ambassador.[62] Iran's direct involvement with the FIS was negligible. But its declaratory support for Algeria's Islamic movement played well in the wider world of Sunni Islamic activism.

Iran handled relations with Sunni movements through several agencies. Rafsanjani had an adviser for Sunni affairs: Sayyid Muhammad Ishaq Madani, himself a Sunni cleric and a member of the Assembly of Experts. But his responsibilities were mostly domestic.[63] Khamene'i had a more effective agent: Shaykh Muhammad 'Ali al-Taskhiri, responsible for international affairs in Khamene'i's office. He was president of the Ahl al-Bayt League and secretary-general of the annual Islamic Thought Conference[64] (see *MECS* 1990, p. 181).

In this latter capacity, Taskhiri demonstrated considerable reach. The ninth Islamic

Copyrighted material

Thought Conference met in Tehran from 29–31 January. It was attended by 400 persons from 48 countries, all selected by Taskhiri.[65] The conference was devoted to the theme of Khomeyni and the worldwide mission of Islam. Rafsanjani, in his opening speech, offered Iran as an example to be emulated, and condemned the West for the position it took over recent events in Algeria, a stand that magnified the internal contradictions of imperialism. Rafsanjani did not preach violence: "The Islamic movement does not need to rebel against the international order. We can work within the limits of international regulations."[66] All the same, the conference resolutions did condemn the "new world order" and any US military presence in Muslim lands. The conference also rejected any negotiated compromise of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and called for the liberation of Palestine "from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean."[67] This essentially reiterated the stand taken by a Tehran conference of the previous autumn, which had been timed to coincide with the opening of direct Arab-Israeli peace talks. (On that conference, see *MECS* 1991, pp. 195–97.)[68]

But the Islamic Thought Conference, with its strong emphasis on the commemoration of Khomeyni, remained a predominantly Shi'i enterprise. In the promotion of Islamic ecumenism, known as *taqrib,* or reconciliation, Iran took a separate lead. At the end of 1991, Khamene'i had established an Academy for the Reconciliation of Islamic Schools (*Majma' al-taqrib bayna al-madhahib al-islamiyya*), at the head of which he placed Hojjat al-Islam Shaykh Wa'ith Zadeh. In 1992, the Academy began to issue statements in response to various events.[69] It also revived Islamic Unity Week, which had been instituted early in the revolution, in the week spanning the two birthdays of the Prophet Muhammad, one according to the Shi'i tradition, the other according to the Sunni. The fifth International Conference on Islamic Unity met in Tehran from 13–15 September. There were 400 participants, including 50 from abroad. Speakers included the guide of the Jordanian Muslim Brethren, 'Abd al-Rahman Khalifa; leader of the Iraqi Shi'i opposition, Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim; the Anglo-Pakistani activist Kalim Siddiqui (on whom, see below); and Taskhiri.[70] Khalifa, as a prominent leader of the Muslim Brethren, loomed as the most important foreign guest. He had little to say about Sunni-Shi'i reconciliation; but during his visit, he reiterated his opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process in uncompromising terms. The Jews were trying to create a "Greater Israel" which, according to Khalifa, extended southward to Medina in Arabia and northward into central Turkey, and included all of Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, and "a large part" of northern Egypt.[71] This message of the Israeli menace constituted the common ground on which Iran and Sunni Islamic movements tried to build their reconciliation.

There was an alternative concept of reconciliation, which was revived by an Iranian in Egypt during 1992. In 1948, an Iranian cleric, Muhammad Taqi Qommi, had cooperated with al-Azhar in establishing the Institute for Reconciliation, or Dar al-Taqrib, bringing together Sunnis and Shi'is. It achieved a major gain in 1959, when Nasser's Shaykh al-Azhar, Mahmud Shaltut, issued an edict recognizing the Shi'a as a fifth school of Islamic jurisprudence.[72] But the Iranian Revolution of 1979 reawakened sectarian prejudice. Dar al-Taqrib froze its activities, and Muhammad Taqi Qommi went to live in Paris. In 1990, however, he sent his son, 'Abdallah Qommi, back to Egypt to reactivate Dar al-Taqrib. Muhammad Taqi Qommi died soon afterward, but 'Abdallah Qommi announced the official reopening of the Dar al-Taqrib in September 1992. "The Dar is against proselytizing," he explained. "It is not one of its

Copyrighted material

functions to spread Islam, but to resolve the problems facing the Islamic community — mainly the mutual mistrust between Shi'is and Sunnis." And he struck this ecumenical note: "The three caliphs are dead, also 'Ali and his sons. Whatever we do or say, we can never restore 'Ali or his sons to power or to life. The difference is political. So we can talk, agree to differ, but should always remember that the difference is not religious but political."[73] Qommi's initiative may have enjoyed official Egyptian sanction; it had no repercussions whatsoever in Iran.

HAMAS AND IRAN

To bolster its standing as the only state openly opposed to an Arab-Israeli accord, Iran tried to expand its influence among Palestinians. Iran did have Palestinian clients, in the form of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, but they were a troublesome crowd, whose leaders deeply distrusted one another. Fathi al-Shiqqaqi and Ahmad Muhanna, two of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad's most prominent leaders, were usually at loggerheads. Another, Shaykh As'ad Bayyud al-Tamimi, was a mercurial old man, given to sudden bouts of misplaced enthusiasm, such as his ardent support for Saddam Husayn in the Gulf War. In any case, they represented the minority trend with Palestinian Islamism. Iran sought closer ties with the mainstream, in the form of Hamas.

During the course of the year, Hamas set up an office in Tehran, under the direction of 'Imad al-'Alami, a young engineer deported from Gaza in 1990. This evoked some alarm in the PLO, which had an embassy in Tehran and feared that the Hamas office might evolve into a rival embassy. Bassam Abu Sharif, an adviser to PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat in Tunis, warned Iran against according an "official" status to the Hamas office in Tehran, since this would damage "Palestinian legality."[74] A Hamas representative in Jordan, Muhammad Nazzal, made it clear that the Hamas office in Tehran had no diplomatic status.[75] But if Iran intended to provoke the PLO by its move, it succeeded, and the PLO began to warn the West against the prospect of Iranian infiltration of Hamas.

The Iranian Foreign Ministry also invited a Hamas delegation to Tehran, and it arrived in October, under the leadership of Musa Abu Marzuq, head of the Hamas office in Damascus, who held meetings with Khamene'i and Iranian Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati.[76] According to various reports emanating from the PLO, Iran pledged to support Hamas with a subsidy of $30m. a year. Iran also allegedly agreed to place Hamas fighters in training camps in Iran, Lebanon and Sudan, where they could train in street-fighting. It also reportedly agreed to assist Hamas in setting up a radio station in Hizballah-controlled territory in Lebanon, and a production company for films.[77] Hamas, however, denied there were any military agreements with Iran. The visit served simply to "find more support" for the Intifada.[78] Marzuq paid a second visit in December, in what had now become a fixed routine. First he proceeded to the Hamas "embassy"; then he prayed on Friday by the side of leading Iranians (in this instance, at Tehran University); and finally he participated in high-level meetings.

In the aftermath of these visits, a Jordanian newspaper published what it presented as the text of a political agreement between Iran and Hamas, supposedly signed in Qom. The alleged agreement included a sharp denunciation of the PLO and 'Arafat, and recognized Hamas as the "sole legitimate representative of the Jihad being conducted by the Palestinian people."[79] Hamas spokesman in Jordan, Ibrahim

Copyrighted material

Ghawsha, was quick to deny the existence of such an agreement.[80] The nature of Iran-Hamas ties remained a matter of speculation, but both the state and the movement emphasized that they intended to expand the dialogue between them. Israel's deportation of over 400 Hamas activists to Lebanon on 17 December set the stage for even closer cooperation in future.

HIZBALLAH: POLITICAL PARTY OF GOD

Hizballah in Lebanon remained the great success story of Iran's Islamic influence. In the decade since its emergence in 1982, Hizballah had bought and fought its way into the hearts of perhaps as many as half of Lebanon's Shi'is. Its violence had made it a household word in the West. But the end of Lebanon's civil war and the strengthening of the Syrian-backed government compelled the movement to conform to the new rules of Lebanese party politics. Hizballah continued to see itself as a movement of armed resistance, especially against Israel in South Lebanon. It still owed its allegiance to Iran. But it also elected its first deputies to the Lebanese parliament. The year's events served to underline the growing contradiction between Hizballah as an Islamic movement and as a Lebanese party. (For more on Hizballah in its Lebanese context, see chapter on Lebanon.)

On one level, Hizballah seemed to continue as before. Its fighters conducted operations against Israel's self- declared "security zone" in the south, and Israel struck Hizballah targets. On 16 February, Israeli helicopter gunships assassinated Hizballah's secretary-general, Sayyid 'Abbas al-Musawi, as he proceeded in a motorcade along a road in the south. His wife, child and several bodyguards also died in the attack.[81] Hizballah struck back with attacks in Lebanon; its clandestine branch, Islamic Jihad, car-bombed the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires on 17 March, killing 29 persons and injuring 242. Islamic Jihad described the bombing as retaliation for Musawi's killing.[82] Hizballah immediately replaced Musawi, selecting Shaykh Hasan Nasrallah as secretary-general, and he promised that the battle would continue.

But despite that promise, Hizballah and its Iranian patrons realized that their environment had changed. First, the Arab-Israeli peace process had gained legitimacy, if not momentum. Lebanon and Syria were involved in direct talks with Israel, and Syria set more stringent limits on the scale and timing of Hizballah's operations. As one negotiating round followed another in 1992, Hizballah's mentor, Ayatollah Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah anticipated a breakthrough, and did not take solace in perceptions of stalemate. "The talks are moving at a snail's pace in order to condition the Arab mentality to accept Israel through this continuous dialogue," Fadlallah said. "This phase is one of normalization through negotiations."[83] The scenario of peace with Israel seemed not only possible, but probable.

Second, Lebanon moved steadily toward an internal reconciliation, backed by Syrian arms. The central government began to reassert its claim to sovereignty, and militias either disbanded or were incorporated in the Lebanese army. Hizballah enjoyed a partial exemption from this process, to allow it to continue operations against Israel in the South. But away from the South, Hizballah had no choice but to comply with the new rules. In late July, the Lebanese army reclaimed the Shaykh 'Abdallah barracks in Ba'albak, which had been the principal joint base of Hizballah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. The heavily fortified complex, looming over its surroundings like a medieval fort of the Assassins, had been the heart of an

Copyrighted material

extraterritorial domain, which often seemed like an extension of Iran. Its surrender to the Lebanese army, mediated by Syria and Iran, did not diminish Hizballah's fighting capacity, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards redeployed to another facility. But Hizballah's evacuation of the barracks dramatized the end of an illusion. The Lebanese state would not wither away, and seemed poised to grow stronger in the years to come.

Faced with the prospect of peace, in the region and in Lebanon, Hizballah had to reassess its position. Fadlallah offered a strategy for Hizballah, should Lebanon and Israel conclude a peace:

> The battle which will commence after reconciliation with Israel will be the battle against the subjugation of the Arab and Muslim person to Israel, in politics, culture, economics, and security.... The Islamists must deploy their Qur'anic and Islamic legal culture to combat normalization. *Fatwa*s [religious edicts] should be issued against purchasing Israeli goods and receiving the Israelis. The Islamists may not enjoy complete success, because not all Muslims are committed to Islam. But this will hamper much of the effort by Israel to encircle the region and become a natural member in it.[84]

Hizballah would seek to prevent the peace between states from becoming a reconciliation between peoples. It would build on the resentments of those excluded from the "new order" in Lebanon and the region, until that order could be overturned.

But the more urgent decision concerned Hizballah's relationship to Lebanon's rehabilitation. The next scheduled step in this process was elections, which had not been held in Lebanon since 1972. Hizballah divided over the decision to participate. Some in Hizballah recoiled at the very idea of joining the "political club," arguing that there was no way they could win. If they remained a parliamentary minority, their presence in parliament legitimated a non-Islamic state; if they ever gained a parliamentary majority, they would be crushed, as had happened in Algeria. Better to concentrate on Jihad, and avoid the pollution of politics. This view was championed by Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli, a past secretary-general of Hizballah.[85]

Fadlallah strongly disagreed. Since the road of Jihad was blocked, just what did the opponents of elections propose? To "sit in their seats, waiting for the Prophet to send down angels to clear the way for them to take power here or there"?[86] Fadlallah favored complete immersion in politics, as the only way to break out of the growing encirclement of Islamic resistance and Jihad:

> The road to change does not lead only through revolution, because we now face difficult circumstances that prevent revolution. But we can embark on change in our own way, through all the institutions that we can penetrate, and despite the siege being laid on Islamists throughout the world. Others want us to stand outside the locked gate or closed door, so we must open a crack here and a crack there. In order to change reality, we have to be active at every level of reality.[87]

In the context of Lebanon, this meant full participation in parliamentary elections.

And so a decade after Hizballah's creation, the "Party of God" became a real political party, and some of its clerics became candidates. The party drew up a platform based upon the welfare of the dispossessed and rejection of peace with Israel. Iran gave its support to this decision, and Hizballah vigorously contested the elections,

Copyrighted material

held in two rounds in August and September. Given the limitations of the electoral system, the results were impressive. Hizballah's candidates swept Ba'albak and Hirmil, and captured the most votes in Nabatiyya and Tyre. All of its candidates were elected, for a total of eight parliamentary seats. Four other allied deputies also won seats, and together these 12 deputies constituted the largest single block in the fragmented 128-man parliament. (For a detailed account of the elections, see chapter on Lebanon.)[88]

Hizballah's entry into the "political club" raised the question of the movement's loyalty — or, more precisely, its dual loyalty. For a decade, its clerics had denounced the state and idea of Lebanon as creations of imperialism. Hizballah had flown the Iranian flag and pledged allegiance to Khomeyni, then Khamene'i. There was no purer example of a pan-Islamic movement in the ME, a movement which openly took pride in its dependence on outside sources of inspiration, guidance, guns and funds. The decision to run for parliament forced Hizballah to explain to itself and to the world just how it proposed to reconcile loyalty to Lebanon with loyalty to an Iranian-centered Islam.

This task fell to Nasrallah. On visits to Iran, Nasrallah spoke openly of the link to Iran: "We consider ourselves part of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. This is no secret and this relationship existed in the past. It is natural for the Islamic revolution in Iran to assist all liberation movements in the world."[89] Furthermore, Hizballah believed in the "guardianship of the jurisprudent." On the "religious level," Hizballah followed Khamene'i, as it had followed Khomeyni before.[90]

Yet in this statement, Nasrallah made a distinction that would have been unthinkable a few years before. He formulated allegiance to Iran's leader as a religious obligation, not a political one. Khomeyni had decried the distinction between religion and politics as an evil. Yet here was Nasrallah's response to a question about his frequent visits to Iran: "This is a religious tradition that has nothing to do with politics." Khamene'i was the leader, "as a scholar and a jurist,"[91] and Hizballah was "loyal to the leader and his course."[92] But Hizballah no longer acknowledged the political dimension of this loyalty, as it had in Khomeyni's day.

At the same time, Nasrallah made a series of statements that minimized Hizballah's special link to Iran, and emphasized its Lebanese character. Did Hizballah's leaders not go to Tehran for frequent consultation? "Hizballah's leaders occasionally visit Tehran for talks with Iranian officials and Islamic leaders," admitted Nasrallah. But "Hizballah's leaders visit other world capitals and confer with various leaders in the Islamic world." Did Hizballah not hold conclaves in Tehran? Nasrallah: "Hizballah holds its conferences in Lebanon, not in Tehran. Hizballah cannot transport all its cadres to Tehran to hold a meeting there. It is logical for Hizballah to hold its conferences here, where the majority of its members live."[93] Did Hizballah not really serve Iran's interests? Nasrallah: "Hizballah's resistance and the martyrs it offered were not to achieve Iran's interests in the narrow, regional sense. It fought for the sake of Lebanese territory, defended the Lebanese people....If we are to judge whether a certain force is Lebanese or not, I ask: Is there a better criterion than defending the land and the people?" Didn't Iran issue orders to Hizballah? Nasrallah called Iran a "pioneering experiment," but Hizballah had its own consultative council, elected by a general conference. "This confirms that it is an independent party and entity."[94] Did Iranians not fight in the ranks of Hizballah? Nasrallah: "Hizballah is not an Iranian

Copyrighted material

colony in Lebanon. Its fighters and Mujahidin in the Resistance are not Iranians." Did Hizballah not get lots of aid from Iran? A people whose land was occupied, said Nasrallah, had the right to seek help where it could find it.[95]

Nasrallah's remarks did not signal an about-face, and Hizballah's commitment to the Lebanese state remained tenuous at best. In most respects, Hizballah remained an extraparliamentary movement — a point emphasized by the obscurity of the movement's parliamentary candidates. Hizballah's actual leaders remained in the mosques and in the fighting ranks of the Islamic Resistance. And Hizballah remained intimately tied to Iran on every level. But the "Party of God" had moved one reluctant step toward becoming a modern *hizb,* a political party of its followers in a political system governed by the peculiar rules of Lebanon.

RUSHDIE EMERGES

On the question of Salman Rushdie, the Indian-born British author of *The Satanic Verses,* Iran continued to toe the hard line. For all those who argued that Iran gave precedence to interest of state over the mission of Islam, the plight of Rushdie served as a reality check — one which would not go away, because of Rushdie's own high visibility. Rushdie had lain low for most of 1991, in the hope that this would encourage Iran to climb down from Khomeyni's *fatwa* of February 1989, which called for Rushdie's death. Iran did nothing of the sort, and Rushdie shifted tack in 1992, with a spate of public appearances and foreign travel. (For the evolution of the Rushdie affair, see *MECS* 1989, pp. 173–80; 1990, pp. 177–80; 1991, pp. 187–88.)

On the third anniversary of the *fatwa,* Iran's leaders and the press reaffirmed it with enthusiasm. A special supplement of the newspaper *Jumhuriyye Islami,* bearing the headline "A Divine Command to Stone the Devil," carried extracts from their statements upholding the *fatwa.*[96] A brief flurry of speculation following the meeting, on 13 February, between an employee of the Iranian Embassy in London and Dr. Frances d'Souza, chairperson of the International Committee for the Defense of Salman Rushdie. Rushdie grew optimistic: "This is the first direct contact between Iran and my supporters," he told 300 writers and civil rights campaigners during a surprise visit to their London conference on freedom of speech, convened in his honor.[97] But the Foreign Ministry in Tehran quickly squelched all speculation: d'Souza had been told that the *fatwa* was "a global Islamic matter" and "absolutely irreversible."[98] Still, Iranian radicals suspected that the meeting was a trial balloon floated by the Foreign Ministry to take the measure of opinion back at home. The Tehran *Abrar* called the meeting an "unforgivable mistake" and "disgraceful."[99] To bring home the radicals' point, Khamene'i's representative to the 15th of Khordad Foundation reiterated its offer of a $2m. reward to anyone who carried out the edict — and later added that it would reimburse the would-be killer for all "additional expenditures."[100]

Rushdie then went on an offensive, which involved a good deal of foreign travel, "surprise" appearances, and attempts to meet parliamentary and government officials. He conceded that his earlier attempt to gain some sort of readmission to Islam had been a mistake, as was his promise at that time to desist from paperback publication of the book. His campaign took off on the third anniversary of the *fatwa,* when 25 "quality newspapers" that formed World Media encouraged leading literary figures to

Copyrighted material

reiterate their support for Rushdie. A paperback edition of the book also appeared in the US in March, published anonymously by sponsors calling themselves the Consortium. (Viking Penguin, after long delaying the paperback version, had returned the rights to Rushdie earlier in the year.)

On the occasion of the March publication, Rushdie made his second visit to the US since the *fatwa,* where he spoke to conferences on free expression in New York and Washington.[101] In Washington, Rushdie met with a group of seven senators on Capitol Hill. However, no one from the Administration or the State Department met him, "because at this time we felt that such a thing could and possibly might be misinterpreted," said a State Department spokesperson. The White House spokesperson called Rushdie "just another author on a book tour."[102] In October, Rushdie visited Germany, Iran's largest Western trading partner. "Because there is this very large economic involvement, that gives Germany more power in Iran," said Rushdie. In Bonn he met with members of the ruling and opposition parties, and a high Foreign Ministry official.[103] In December, Rushdie visited Canada, where he was received by the external affairs secretary.[104] He visited Norway and Sweden, and in November, the foreign ministers of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden issued a joint official protest to Iran for not lifting the *fatwa.* In December, the European Council at Edinburgh said that improvement in Iran's behavior in several areas, including the Rushdie *fatwa,* would be an important factor in determining the extent to which closer relations could be developed.

None of this produced any movement in Iran. In June, when Rushdie held a pre-publicized press conference in the House of Commons in London, the Iranian Majlis dashed off an angry protest.[105] In November, Iran's Chief Justice Ayatollah Morteza Moqtada'i announced that the *fatwa* was "an Islamic order and irrevocable."[106] But by his campaign, Rushdie succeeded in putting Iran on the defensive once again. So long as the *fatwa* stood, Rushdie promised Iran it would have to answer for it in every major Western capital.

THE SIDDIQUI PHENOMENON

The Satanic Verses affair had given some prominence to Kalim Siddiqui, the pro-Iranian Pakistani activist who directed the Muslim Institute in Britain, where he led the campaign against Rushdie.[107] A keen Muslim observer of Islam in Britain wrote of Siddiqui: "He fits — indeed looks — the negative media stereotype of Islam in the West....Who can forget Siddiqui, eyes blazing and beard bristling, on the international television news, pointing a threatening finger at the camera, and promising Islam will get you."[108] Iran supported Siddiqui's activities, which it hoped would create links with Muslim activists in Britain, especially in the large communities of South Asians in Bradford and London. To the charges that he was funded from abroad, Siddiqui responded by pointing out that former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher had raised money from abroad for an institute in her name. "We live in a global village," he pointed out. "The Muslims of Britain are an inseparable part of the Muslim nation."[109]

Siddiqui now used the leverage and publicity he had amassed as a media icon in order to convene the inaugural meeting of his Islamic Consultative Council in Britain, known also as the "Islamic Parliament," from 4–5 January. He had worked for two years to bring this council together, in an effort to transform the Muslims of Britain into a "political society." The council assembled 155 nonelected "delegates," all

Copyrighted material

Muslims resident in Britain. Siddiqui's own newspaper gave the following breakdown of "delegates" by origin: 23% Punjabis and others from the Indian subcontinent; 21% Kashmiris; 18% Bengalis; 10% Turks; 9% Africans; 9% Arabs; and 10% converts to Islam, divided about evenly between Afro-Caribbeans and white Britons. About 60% were Sunnis, the rest presumably Shi'is.[110] The complete absence of Iranians from the council was probably meant to confound charges of Iranian manipulation. The deliberations of the council, which opened with a procession bearing the Qur'an and chants of "God is great," centered largely on education, including the establishment of Muslim schools and a Muslim college.[111] Much of the British press and public, and Siddiqui's Muslim opponents, saw the council as a plan for secession from wider society. He did not deny this, and seemed to relish their criticism.[112] The council convened a second session from 2–3 May.[113] Siddiqui took that occasion to warn Rushdie once again: "This *fatwa* and our presence in this country will keep Rushdie pinned down in his bunker for the rest of his life." Siddiqui even expanded the threat: the edict "will be deemed to apply to anyone who ignores the line that has been drawn by us in the sands of history."[114] It was an open question whether any authority in Islam now had the power to redraw that line on the other side of Rushdie.

MARJA'IYYA AND MADRASA

On 8 August, the Grand Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-Kho'i died in the Iraqi city of Kufa, at the age of 93. He was buried in Najaf.[115] His death reopened the wider question of the *marja'iyya,* a form of Shi'i authority quite independent of the Iranian state, conferred on the foremost Shi'i clerics by the informal consensus of their peers in the Shi'i seminaries. Kho'i, an Azeri who had resided in Najaf since 1912, had been a leading *marja',* whose standing exceeded that of Khomeyni outside Iran, especially in Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, India and East Africa. Kho'i had presided over an empire of religious and philanthropic institutions, run by a governing board that met twice annually. His institute had branches in New York, Detroit, Toronto, Beirut, Islamabad and Bombay. The institute opened a new center in London during the year, and the New York branch entered a new building in 1989, with a large meeting and conference hall, a library, social halls and classrooms. A typical Kho'i center included schools, restaurants and orphanages, all supported by the tithes of millions of Shi'i believers.

Who would replace Kho'i upon his death? The Iraqi Government, possessing absolute control over the Shi'i shrines city of Najaf and its seminaries, eventually encouraged the candidacy of Sayyid Muhammad Husayn al-Sadr. He was not regarded as the most learned man in Najaf — Ayatollah 'Abd al-'Ala Sabzevari had a better reputation — but Sadr was an Arab who promised to accommodate the Iraqi regime, whereas Sabzevari was an Iranian who had opposed the regime in the past. In these circumstances, the preferences in Qom had greater significance. Ayatollahs Muhammad Reza Golpaygani and Muhammad 'Ali Araki had followings in Qom, but Golpaygani enjoyed the advantage and won the endorsement of Kho'i's followers.[116] Still, Golpaygani's advanced years — he was born in 1899 — assured that the question of the *marja'iyya* would be posed again. His death in 1993 did just that (see *MECS* 1993).

Kho'i's passing therefore led at least one prominent Shi'i cleric to propose a radical revision of the *marja'iyya.* Hizballah's mentor, Ayatollah Fadlallah, had been Kho'i's representative in Lebanon, and now accepted Golpaygani as Kho'i's successor. (Gol-

Copyrighted material

paygani's name had "emerged strongly," said Fadlallah, "and we support his authority.")[117] But Fadlallah also offered a critical view of the ways in which a *marja'* emerged and functioned.

He began by leveling criticism at the state of the great Shi'i seminaries, the traditional incubators for the *marja'iyya.* The headship of such a seminary, either in Najaf or in Qom, had been the customary credential of any great *marja'*. Fadlallah now dismissed the seminaries as irrelevant to leadership. From an organizational point of view, the academies were four centuries behind the times, and their structure no longer met contemporary needs. Fadlallah favored a sweeping reform: admission standards, curriculum reform, examinations and formal graduation.[118]

In Fadlallah's view, the seminaries had specialized in the kinds of questions "which no longer have great importance in the exercise of *ijtihad,*" the judgment exercised by accredited jurisprudents.[119] The burning questions that faced Shi'ism were political, and had to be handled by a figure versed not only in the nuances of Islamic law, but in the complexities of world politics. Fadlallah pointed out that the remaining great ayatollahs, Khomeyni's aged contemporaries, had differed with Khomeyni over the active role of clerics, and were not up to the political task in hand. Future candidates for the *marja'iyya* from the seminaries were people who had never pronounced on politics. And few of their names resonated throughout Shi'ism.[120]

"It is necessary to specify new conditions for the elements that make up the personality of the *marja',*" Fadlallah concluded. This person would have to possess a commanding grip of world affairs "down to the last nuance."[121] No longer could the role be fulfilled by a scholar who knew only the life of the seminary: "I imagine that the *marja'* would have to be open to the entire world, as Islam is open to the world. He would have to be a person aware of events as they unfold daily down to the smallest details, either through reports submitted to him or direct experience." And the *marja'* would not simply issue rulings on matters related to Islamic law. He would take political stands on every issue related to the general welfare of Islam.[122]

Such a leader would have a global mandate, since the challenge facing Shi'ism could only be met on a global scale. The tensions between Islamic schools, the relations with other religions, the great political and social issues — these could not be dealt with by local clerics, since they affected the entire Islamic world.[123] Fadlallah envisioned a universal *marja'iyya,* established as a single institution, with a permanent headquarters. It would house a collection of documents of all the rulings of the previous incumbents, so that the new *marja'* could begin precisely where his predecessor left off. He would not remain in his seat, but would travel throughout the world, to speak to people and open their minds. He would be assisted by experts who would prepare studies of specific problems. He would have representatives in various countries, who would function like ambassadors. Fadlallah then drew a remarkable parallel: "When I look for an example of how I imagine the role of the *marja',* I find the example of the papacy, which takes political, cultural and social positions in accord with its comprehensive religious character."[124]

Fadlallah's idea of the *marja'iyya* represented so sharp a break with Shi'i tradition that he did not dare suggest it might have an Islamic precedent. The only detail he did not provide was how such a *marja'* would be selected. Would a college of ayatollahs make the choice in a secret conclave, announcing their decision by a plume of white smoke? Fadlallah did not say. But perhaps it was no coincidence that the "personality"

Copyrighted material

he envisioned for the *marja'* strongly resembled his own. Fadlallah held that the seminaries of Najaf and Qom no longer produced real leaders — a convenient argument for an aspirant who did not head a seminary. Few clerical candidates could surpass Fadlallah in his knowledge of current affairs, his contacts in diplomacy and journalism, and his experience in dialogue. The obviously demanding role of a traveling *marja'* could be filled only by a vital man in his prime, not by the old men who stood at the pinnacle of Shi'ism.

This transformation of the Shi'i *marja'iyya* seemed far-fetched. But Fadlallah's call for a reform of the Shi'i seminaries did find an echo, at a conference of seminary heads which met during the year in Islamabad, Pakistan. It was organized by Sayyid Sajid al-Naqwi, head of the "Movement for the Application of Fiqh" in Pakistan. The conference was under the guidance of Khamene'i, and brought participants from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Iran. The theme of the conference was solidarity with the Muslims of Kashmir, Palestine and Afghanistan. The participants visited Pakistani Kashmir, including its capital of Muzaffarabad, as well as Sunni and Shi'i refugee camps. But the seminary heads also discussed the need for internal reform. Since the Iranian Revolution, the seminaries had been called upon to provide leadership cadres for Islamic movements and, in the case of Iran, even ambassadors, ministers and heads of state institutions. The seminaries would have to change to meet changing needs.[125]

One seminary in Qom had undergone a transformation, although not the kind envisioned in the conference. The Hujjatiyya Madrasa had been founded in 1940 by Ayatollah Muhammad Hujjat. Before the revolution, it trained both Iranian and foreign students, as did all the Qom madrasas. But after the revolution, the Hujjatiyya Madrasa answered the growing demand of foreign students, and became an institution exclusively for foreigners. In 1992, the madrasa had 400 students of 30 nationalities, Sunnis and Shi'is. They included Europeans, Africans and Latin Americans.[126]

Had Iran's revolution remade all of Shi'ism? It could not make that claim until it had transformed the basic concepts of authority in Shi'ism. The will to do so — to subordinate the faith completely to politics — certainly existed. Whether institutions like the *marja'iyya* and the madrasa would succumb remained to be seen.

ISLAM FOR SADDAM

Iraq, which had claimed to carry the banner for all Islam in its failed war for Kuwait, now pretended that it suffered on behalf of all Islam as it languished under international sanctions. For that purpose, it convened the fifth Popular World Islamic Conference from 17–20 January, on the anniversary of the war. (On the origins and development of this organization, see *MECS* 1982–83, pp. 243–45; 1984–85, p. 151; 1987, p. 438; 1990, pp. 194–95; 1991, pp. 172–73.) The participants, who were said to number 500, were obscure figures. Even those who were featured by Iraq's media had little standing. They included a Sudanese shaykh, Yasin 'Umar al-Imam, who represented Turabi's National Islamic Front; a representative of the Algerian FIS; a certain Shaykh Muhammad al-Kafrawi ("preacher of al-Aqsa mosque"); Shaykh Ja'far Nasir, imam of the Leningrad Mosque; and one Shaykh Muhammad al-Hasnawi of Syria. Saddam decided not to address the gathering this time, leaving the task to 'Izzat Ibrahim, vice president of the Revolutionary Command Council. The final statement

Copyrighted material

of the conference endorsed all of Iraq's positions against the "US-Zionist-Atlantic-Crusader aggression," and condemned the blockade of Iraq. The conference also rejected UN Security Council resolutions against Iraq, and denounced neighboring states for complying with them: "It is religiously unlawful, it is a sin, and it is a flagrant aggression for Muslims to besiege their Muslim brothers." The gathering also denounced the Jidda-based ICO as "a tool in the hands of world Zionism," for upholding the sanctions against Iraq. Each conferee pledged "to do my best to lift the blockade imposed on the kinfolk of Iraq, and to fight this blockade using my money, my tongue and my body."[127] As expected, Kuwaiti and Saudi sources denounced the conference as a sham. Ma'ruf al-Dawalibi, a Saudi client who chaired the executive council of the Popular Islamic Conference, called the Baghdad session "illegal," and urged that it be boycotted.[128]

In an odd move, the head of an obscure Sufi order in Iraq, probably at government instruction, created a revised Islamic calendar called the "Muhammadan" calendar. Unlike the traditional Islamic calendar, which commences with the migration (*hijra*) of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina, this new calendar commenced with the Prophet's birth. By this account, it was the year 1466. With the exception of Ramadan, all the months were renamed for events in early Islamic history.

The initiative was reminiscent of Libya's juggling of the Islamic calendar, which had put Libya ten years out of synchronization with the rest of the Islamic world. The reaction to the Iraqi proposal in the wider Muslim world came swiftly. Scholars at al-Azhar University in Cairo, as well as the chief shaykh of the Sufi orders in Egypt, Shaykh Abu al-Wafa al-Taftazani, were quick to denounce the "tampering" as a Ba'thist innovation. It was "a step toward destroying established things and uprooting foundations on which the Islamic system has been based for centuries."[129] In the end, the Iraqi regime did not implement the calendar, perhaps realizing that the deviation would only further compound Iraq's isolation in Islam.

ISLAMIC POWER, SAUDI PURSE

Saudi Arabia busily reconstructed the network of Islamic ties which were meant to confirm its primacy in Islam — a pretension damaged by the Gulf War and Saudi reliance on foreign forces. Intellectually, Saudi Arabia was not up to the task, and left Egypt to formulate cogent arguments against "extremism." The Saudi media simply amplified and reprinted the speeches and interviews of articulate Egyptians like Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali and Shaykh al-Azhar Jadd al-Haqq 'Ali Jadd al-Haqq.[130] Ideas were in short supply, and in February it was announced that the Faysal prize for modern Islamic studies would not be awarded, since "none of the relevant submissions for 1992 satisfied the aims and objectives of the prize."[131] This was not an encouraged commentary on the intellectual state of Saudi-inspired Islam. But money, not ideas, were the strong cards of Saudi Arabia's Islamic appeal, and the kingdom played them several times during the year.

The most important instrument of Saudi influence remained the ICO. It devoted most of the year to Bosnia-related diplomacy, but it also rendered continuing service to the Saudi house, which funded most of the expenses of the secretariat. The ICO secretary-general, Hamid Algabid, also received the Faysal prize for services to Islam. The ICO expanded during the year, admitting Albania, Kirghizia, Tajikistan, Turk-

Copyrighted material

menistan and Zanzibar. By year's end, there were 51 member states. (For the ICO's diplomacy, see section on Bosnia below.)

The government also had an Islamic affairs committee attached to the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Pilgrimage. The committee had reportedly dispensed SR2.2bn. "in recent years" as Islamic aid.[132] This included everything from relief funds to lavish mosques. In September, for example, Prince Salman Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, governor of Riyadh province, inaugurated a Saudi-financed mosque and Islamic center in Madrid, built at a cost of $25m. King Juan Carlos attended the opening.[133]

Saudi Arabia also produced most of Islam's copies of the Qur'an, at a complex for Qur'an production on the Medina-Tabuk highway, inaugurated in March 1985 and named after King Fahd. Established at cost of SR486m., the plant had been bolstered by an investment of another SR1bn., and operated on an annual budget of SR400m. The complex, which employed 500 people, adhered to the most rigorous standards of production. In the first seven years of operation, the plant produced over 70m. copies of the Qur'an. Each year, 6m. copies were published in Arabic, and another 2m. in English, French, Chinese, Turkish, Urdu and the Hausa languages of Africa — all distributed free of charge. In the largest single gift, King Fahd donated 1m. Qur'ans to Central Asia.[134]

Saudi Arabia also employed the Mecca-based Muslim World League (MWL; *Rabitat al-'alam al-Islami*). In 1992, the MWL reported its expenditures for the year 1990–91. These included SR16.9m. for Islamic organizations, institutions and centers; SR12.7m. for preachers; SR6.5m. for the MWL's offices worldwide; and SR3.9m. for medical supplies and emergency aid to hospitals and clinics supported by the MWL.[135] During the year, King Fahd gave the MWL a new building, valued at nearly SR100m.[136] He also used the MWL as his Islamic platform, addressing the 31st session of its constituent council, which met in Mecca from 25–28 January. In his speech, Fahd condemned the Iraqi regime for its "sin," anticipated victory for the Afghan Mujahidin, and hailed the final fall of communism.[137] The gathering then called for "a lasting and durable peace" based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 — essentially an endorsement of the Arab-Israeli talks.[138] The resolutions made no mention of Algeria at all, and the MWL's newspaper carried a lengthy interview with Muhammad Boudiaf, point man of the Algerian coup, in which he said that the Algerian people had no need of an Islamic party, and mentioned the long history of Saudi assistance to the regime.[139] The MWL's council also elected 'Abdallah 'Umar al-Nasif for a third consecutive five-year term as the organization's secretary-general.[140]

Did the MWL's conferences and gatherings make a difference? 'Abd al-Sabur Marzuq, general secretary of Egypt's Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, expressed his frustration with the MWL: "I attended over 20 conferences during my work with the MWL. I used to ask the director of the conferences' department to get the recommendations of conferences two or three years previous, for proposal again. If conference recommendations issued two or three years earlier were not implemented and we were forced to propose them again, it meant that the field was dead and that words or ideas had no reverberation." But he admitted this was a problem of all Islamic gatherings: "Most conferences are mere talk."[141] Still, money flowed with the talk, and it remained the cement that bound together the Saudi empire of influence over Islam.

Copyrighted material

Egypt played the supporting role in this empire, drawing on Saudi largesse to support its underfunded religious establishment. Saudi Arabia continued to fund the International Islamic Council for Da'wa and Relief, a joint Azhar-MWL creation that held its fourth annual conference in Cairo on 28–30 October. Egyptian President Husni Mubarak sent the conference a message, stressing that Islam represented tolerance and moderation.[142] King Fahd also donated £E10m. to al-Azhar during the year.[143]

Whether the Saudi Government controlled all the flow remained an open question. Private donations by wealthy Saudis continued to reach Islamic movements that no longer enjoyed official Saudi approval. In one notable example, a French magazine traced a $1m. check for the personal attorney of FIS leader 'Abbasi Madani back to a Saudi national.[144] Some Saudis were prepared to forgive these movements for their backing of Saddam, just as the West had forgiven Jordan and the PLO. But the Saudi royal house showed no forgiveness.

SAUDI ARABIA AND JERUSALEM

Saudi Arabia, still enraged at Jordan's position during the Gulf War, encroached on the religious legitimacy of Jordan's monarchy, by intervening in the matter of Jerusalem. In April, Saudi Arabia announced that Unesco had issued a report on the disrepair of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, and had appealed to Saudi Arabia to step in and finance repairs. King Fahd authorized the dispatch of experts to inspect the site and estimate costs of repair and restoration, in coordination with Unesco's "Arabiah" Committee for Arab antiquities. Fahd announced he was personally prepared to cover all costs — $10m. for urgent repairs to the Dome of the Rock and $70m. for other Islamic religious sites in Jerusalem — and Egypt expressed its readiness to provide technical and engineering assistance for the project.[145] A group of Egyptian engineers spent a week in Jerusalem and made an estimate of the repair costs.[146]

More than generosity stood behind the offer. Since 1950, Jordan had assumed responsibility for the maintenance of Muslim holy places in Jerusalem, and continued to do so despite the Israeli occupation and annexation of the part of the city that included the sites. Jordan claimed to have spent $240m. on Muslim religious endowments in the city between 1952 and 1991. In recent years, however, financial stringencies had limited Jordan's ability to initiate repairs and improvements at the sites. Saudi Arabia and Egypt, still bearing a grudge against Jordan for its position in the latest Gulf war, took the opportunity of the Unesco report to portray Jordan as a negligent custodian of the Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem.[147]

Jordan reacted angrily. King Husayn immediately announced that he would donate $8.25m. of his own money to cover urgent repairs. His pockets were not quite as deep as King Fahd's: to raise the funds, King Husayn had to sell a country house in England. Jordanian Information Minister Mahmud Sharif said that Jordan would take bids for the restoration, and that "there is no need for any further donations."[148] Saudi Arabia responded by protesting its sincerity and charging Jordan with ignoring successive Unesco appeals for urgent restoration work.[149] Saudi Arabia's Muslim clients were called upon to endorse the Saudi offer.[150]

In the end, Saudi Arabia dropped the matter, and Jordan proceeded to award the restoration contract to a British company. The plan called for covering the dome with

Copyrighted material

a sheet of 24-carat gold, strengthening foundations and walls, and replacing the exterior marble.[151] The Saudi opposition took the opportunity to accuse the Saudi authorities of destroying Islamic sites in Mecca, including a house in which the Prophet Muhammad was said to have been born.[152] But the Saudi Government had made its point: by its financial leverage, it could undermine the religious legitimacy of Jordan's king.

In the midst of this, a figure claiming to represent the MWL made a much-publicized appearance in Jerusalem. Shaykh Ishaq Idris Sakhuta, a Sudanese-born figure based in Cairo and Riyadh, reputedly served as a counselor to the MWL. He had met an American rabbi at an interfaith dialogue in Malta the previous year, and there received an invitation to Israel. Sakhuta accepted, and he arrived in Israel under the auspices of Ziyara International, an agency set up by Israeli businessman Ya'akov Nimrodi to promote international Muslim tourism to Israel. While in Jerusalem, Sakhuta visited Mayor Teddy Kollek, Israeli President Haim Herzog, and the Ashkenazi chief rabbi.[153] Nasif immediately denied that Sakhuta had any connection to the MWL.[154] Sakhuta did not claim to represent the MWL. But he said that the MWL did not object to "the unity of peace-lovers," and expressed his view that "peace in the Middle East is on the doorstep."[155] The significance of this peculiar episode was not clear at all, but it suggested that Saudi Arabia wished to extend its Islamic prestige beyond Mecca, to Jerusalem.

THE PILGRIMAGE OF 1992

In recent years, the pilgrimage had been a barometer of the storms that blew across the face of Islam. In 1992, however, the pilgrimage passed without incident. The lull owed less to a deep reconciliation in Islam, and more to a series of maneuvers which repositioned the various contenders for primacy. (For detailed accounts of the problems that had plagued the pilgrimage, see previous *MECS* volumes.)

The Iranian pilgrims had been the traditional focus of conflict, culminating in the deadly clash between Iranian pilgrims and Saudi police in 1987 that left more than 400 dead. Iran boycotted the pilgrimage from 1988 to 1990, but in 1991, Iran and Saudi Arabia reached an agreement permitting the return of 115,000 Iranian pilgrims. In 1992, Iran again dispatched 115,000 pilgrims, and their pilgrimage again passed without incident. Iran's leadership set the low key of the pilgrimage. Rafsanjani said the political aspect of the pilgrimage — issues like Afghanistan, Algeria and Bosnia — did have to feature in the pilgrimage. But these could not be allowed to have a negative effect on "other dimensions of the pilgrimage," which were ritual. Last year there had been "no problem," and Rafsanjani expressed hope that "excesses and extremes" would be avoided this year as well.[156] Ahmad Khomeyni, son of the late leader of Iran's revolution, told departing pilgrims in a speech at his father's mausoleum that "disavowing the polytheists is not tantamount to opposition to the Saudi and similar governments."[157] This was a reversal of his statement a year earlier, when he had called for protests in Mecca against "regional reactionaries."

Once again Rafsanjani's stalwart, Muhammad Muhammadi-Reyshahri, served as Iran's pilgrimage supervisor. Reyshahri closely followed the conciliatory lead of Iran's leaders, especially during the annual demonstration in Mecca, held on 7 June. Some 3,500 Iranian pilgrims, with yellow ribbons on their arms, guided pilgrims to

Copyrighted material

the demonstration site, in front of the Iranian pilgrimage headquarters. Iranian sources put the crowd at 150,000 pilgrims. As agreed, the pilgrims confined their banners and chants to the familiar "Death to America" and "Death to Israel," making no criticism of the Saudis themselves. The Saudi police and security forces stayed at a distance of several kilometers from the demonstration.[158] There were no incidents, and Rafsanjani expressed his satisfaction: "Of course, I did not think that it was ideal, but it was a relatively good pilgrimage."[159]

There was some complaining by Iranian radicals. On the day of the demonstration, two Iranian newspapers claimed that Iranian pilgrims were subjected to rude searches at Saudi ports of entry. A Saudi official source called these "lies."[160] Rafsanjani responded to the publication of the reports by cautioning the Iranian press: "Our press and media must not magnify the situation to make trouble between Iran and Saudi Arabia. They must consider overriding interests."[161] Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed also on 3,000 Iranian out-of-season pilgrims a week, totaling 150,000 for the year.[162] And Iran sought a foothold in the holy cities. This effort focused on the al-Baqi' cemetery in Medina, the reputed resting place of the Prophet Muhammad's daughter Fatima and four of the twelve imams revered in Shi'i Islam. The Saudis had demolished and closed this cemetery back in 1926: the tearful prayers of intercession by Shi'i pilgrims at the sites struck them as a form of blasphemy. In recent years, the Saudi authorities had agreed to open the cemetery twice a day to Shi'i pilgrims. However, the site remained desolate. Reyshahri informed the Saudis that Iran was prepared to bear the expense of renovation; the Saudi minister for religious endowments replied that Saudi Arabia itself would take measures for the improvement of the present "undesirable condition" of al-Baqi'.[163]

While Iran's pilgrims grew more numerous, Libya's pilgrims did not arrive at all. On 15 April, Libya came under a UN-authorized air embargo, for its refusal to hand over suspects in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988. All countries, including Arab countries, suspended flights to and from Libya; only a special UN committee could authorize flights. (For details, see chapter on Libya.)

Libya's pilgrims normally would have flown to Saudi Arabia, and so Libya used the occasion of the pilgrimage to portray the air embargo as a Western-led crusade against Islam. At first, Libya leveled its criticism strictly against the UN and the "crusading West." In late May, crowds staged a sit-in before UN offices in Tripoli, and clerics at Friday sermons castigated the West for preventing Muslims from performing their religious duty.[164] At the end of May, the Libyan press suggested a boycott of the pilgrimage. Libyans would not go on pilgrimage "if permission has to come from Christians."[165]

But in early June, the campaign took on anti-Saudi overtones, after Libyan mosque preachers criticized the Saudis for upholding the embargo. The would-be pilgrims, in their pilgrims' garments, moved their sit-in protests to the Saudi Embassy in Tripoli.[166] Saudi Arabia issued a quick retort. Saudi Arabia, so it claimed, had informed the UN that it would "facilitate the arrival of Libyan pilgrims." It had also asked Libya how many planes it would send, and instructed Saudi airports to offer ground services to Libyan flights. According to Saudi Arabia, Libya expressed its appreciation for this position, but informed Saudi Arabia that it would not ask for permission to transport its pilgrims this year. According to the Saudis, then, it was the Libyan Government that had prevented the pilgrimage of its own nationals. Laying the blame on Saudi Arabia was a "provocation."[167]

Copyrighted material

Iraq, another Muslim state under an embargo by the West, did send 10,000 pilgrims. On their return, however, the Iraqi Government alleged that they had been mistreated. They had been detained for three days at the Saudi-Iraqi border; the women were subjected to body searches; on arrival, they were held in a desert camp outside Mina; they were prevented from leaving their tents despite sweltering heat; and they were denied sufficient food, water and medical services. According to Iraq's minister of religious affairs, ten Iraqis died as a result of Saudi ill treatment.[168] Iraq called for an Islamic conference to examine "the inhuman treatment of Iraqi pilgrims by the Saudi authorities."[169] The Saudis issued a curt denial, accusing the Iraqi minister of "lying to God."[170]

Saudi Arabia derived satisfaction from the smooth operation of the pilgrimage, which they believed won them esteem in wider Islam. King Fahd also paid the expenses of 13,000 pilgrims from the former Soviet Union, who had no hard currency and whose pilgrimage would have been impossible without Saudi help.[171] Such generosity enhanced the monarchy's claim to speak for true Islam. But the grumbling on the margins of the pilgrimage suggested that that claim had not won universal recognition, and was likely to be challenged once again.

BOSNIA AND ISLAM

During 1992, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which pitted Muslims against Serbs (and later against Croats as well) riveted the attention of the wider Islamic world. Graphic footage of Serbian atrocities against Bosnian Muslims made its way by television and video cassette throughout the Muslim world, stirring sentiments of solidarity with the inhabitants of this besieged Muslim enclave in Europe. Throughout Islam, and sometimes in Bosnia, Muslims claimed that the West's failure to protect Bosnian Muslims from Serbian aggression arose from a hostility to Islam.

But the transformation of the Bosnian Muslim cause into an Islamic cause remained far from complete. This was because the Bosnian Muslims showed little interest in Islam as an organizing principle of politics and society, and because their leaders and intellectuals put more faith in appeals to the conscience of Europe than to the solidarity of Islam. Indeed, Bosnian Muslims often seemed embarrassed by the too-fervent embraces of foreign Islamists. To allay the fears of Western witnesses to these embraces, Bosnian Muslims insisted that they had been Europeans before they were Muslims, and that their Islam differed fundamentally from the Islam that seemed to confront the West in Asia and Africa. As the plight of Bosnian Muslims worsened, the ineffectiveness of the West opened more ground for interpretation of the war as a battle between two rival civilizations and faiths. Yet the world of Islam proved to be no more effective in the defense of Bosnia's embattled Muslims.[172]

ISLAMIC DIPLOMACY

The Western response to the Bosnian crisis consisted of diplomacy, UN resolutions, and humanitarian aid. The response of Muslim states basically mirrored this approach. Still, Muslim states came under additional pressures, which gave their diplomacy more urgency. First, domestic opinion ran strong over Bosnia, and Islamic opposition movements accused their governments of passivity in the face of massacres. Second, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic made exceptional appeals to Muslim states, in

Copyrighted material

the name of Islamic solidarity. Third, Iran pressed vigorously for action, compelling other Muslim states to follow suit. None of this sufficed to make Islamic diplomacy more effective, but it did make for a good deal of activity by the Jidda-based ICO, the diplomatic forum of Muslim states. During the year, the ICO convened two emergency foreign ministers' conferences to deal with the crisis.

The first emergency conference met in Istanbul, from 17–18 June. The previous month, Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati wrote to ICO secretary Hamid Algabid urging the emergency session, and proposing four measures for Muslim states: a recall of ambassadors from Belgrade; severing of diplomatic ties with Serbia; the imposition of economic sanctions; and withholding recognition from the new Yugoslav Federation until a cease-fire and settlement.[173] By the time the conference met, the UN had already imposed sanctions, and several ICO member states had withdrawn their ambassadors, so Iran shifted its emphasis, urging the severing of all diplomatic ties with Belgrade.[174] The ICO did not endorse this position, but the conference resolutions called on the Security Council to invoke UN Charter provisions for use of force if economic sanctions failed. The ICO likewise called on all states not to recognize the Yugoslav Federation of Serbia and Montenegro as successor to the old Yugoslavia until Belgrade had complied with all UN resolutions. The ICO, through its development bank, also promised a program for the reconstruction of Bosnia, but made no specific financial pledges.[175]

As the situation worsened, Iran made more far-reaching proposals. In August, Velayati requested a session of ICO foreign and defense ministers for what he called "a serious political-military decision so that the Islamic countries can compensate for the UN not doing so."[176] But this idea met with opposition even in Iran. The *Tehran Times* called his proposal "miscalculated and unwise," and argued that "any attempt for the dispatch of troops from the Islamic countries will end by benefiting the Serbs."[177] Velayati then spelled out another proposal, in a September meeting of ICO members at the UN General Assembly. There Velayati proposed that the ICO should push the Security Council to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia. Iran recognized the wisdom of embargo against former Yugoslavia, said Velayati, but its application to Bosnia "helped the predator."[178] (Iran had begun to ship arms clandestinely, perhaps as early as May. On 4 September, UN and EC officials said they had confiscated a planeload of automatic weapons headed for Bosnia, aboard an Iranian jumbo jet that landed at Zaghreb airport.)

In late October, Izetbegovic visited Tehran, and in early November, Algabid visited Sarajevo. This set the scene for an Iranian initiative for a second emergency conference, supported by Algabid.[179] The conference met in Jidda from 1–2 December, and was attended by Izetbegovic, who sought a resolution that would lift the "unfair and immoral" arms embargo.[180] King Fahd, in his opening speech, seemed to echo this demand: "The realization of justice requires allowing the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to get the arms it needs for the purposes of legitimate defense of its own existence."[181] But two outsiders came to Jidda precisely to defeat such a proposal: UN special envoy Cyrus Vance and European Council envoy Lord David Owen. Both presented their views to the foreign ministers in a closed session.[182] In the end, they succeeded in moderating the resolutions. The conference urged member states "to extend their cooperation to the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the exercise of its inherent right to individual and collective self-defense in accordance

Copyrighted material

with Article 51 of the UN Charter." It also urged the UN to specify that the arms embargo did not extend to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to review the implementation of Security Council resolutions. If these were not implemented by 15 January 1993, the ICO would then advise members to "respond positively" to Bosnian requests for arms.[183] But the bottom line was that the ICO did not challenge the UN over the arms embargo.

The two ICO conferences did little to alter the desolate landscape of diplomatic failure, and support for Bosnia's Muslims had to be extended in other ways.

MUSLIM VOLUNTEERS AND AID

While diplomacy faltered, a stream of foreign Muslim volunteers arrived in Bosnia to take up arms.[184] These self-styled Mujahidin, who numbered several hundred, came from Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan, Morocco and Algeria. Arriving via Zaghreb in Croatia in the guise of journalists, they crossed overland into Bosnia, where they trained, fought and offered religious instruction. Most stayed for only one or two months at a time, generally in the area around the town of Travnik.

The coordinator of these volunteers was a 50-year-old Saudi businessman, a veteran of guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan, Kashmir and the Philippines. Many of the volunteers were Saudis, over two dozen of whom died in the fighting. The Saudi-based World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) played a particularly active role in recruiting Saudi and other Muslim volunteers. Its relief workers often became Mujahidin; if they were wounded, WAMY covered the cost of their repatriation and hospitalization. The presence of these volunteers symbolized the sympathies of wider Islam, but it did nothing to redress the imbalance between Muslim and Serb. Bosnian officers were said to value the Mujahidin above all for the weapons they brought with them from Croatia. Yet as one observer put it, this support actually harmed the Bosnian cause, since it only raised "the foolish specter" of a fundamentalist Bosnia, a "political bogey" seized upon by the West to avoid coming to Sarajevo's aid.[185]

Muslim individuals, organizations and governments also provided humanitarian aid. According to Saudi officials, the government donated $100m. to Islamic relief organizations, and channeled an additional $50m. in private donations.[186] The donations were collected through a fund chaired by Prince Salman Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, governor of Riyadh province, who also chaired the fund for donations to the Afghan Mujahidin.[187] King Fahd himself opened the Bosnian fund with a contribution of SR30m. from his personal account.[188] According to Prince Salman, the Saudis were airlifting and transporting food continuously to Bosnia, through contracts with Turkish and American food firms.[189] The Saudi-based Islamic Relief Organization provided money, relief workers and supplies, and concentrated on eastern Bosnia, an area other foreign relief agencies usually did not reach. But the line separating humanitarian assistance from weapons supply was often thin. A Saudi official admitted that "since August most of the money raised for relief has been turned over to the Bosnians for weapons." These included assault rifles, mortars and rockets.[190]

Was this another Afghanistan in the making? The gruesome images from Bosnia, however moving, were distant from the daily concerns of other Muslims. Some Arab critics even suggested that the preoccupation with Bosnia was an attempt by Arab governments to divert attention from suffering in Palestine, Iraq and Lebanon.[191] It remained to be seen how long Bosnia could hold the wider Muslim imagination.

Copyrighted material

DEPENDENT ISLAM

Ultimately, the challenge facing Islam went far beyond Bosnia or Palestine. There were nearly 1bn. Muslims in the world, a fifth of world's population. But figures published during the year by Islamic organizations proclaimed them the most dependent fifth on earth:

Income. 86% of Muslims had annual incomes of less than $2,000; 76%, less than $1,000; and 67%, less than $500. The total income of Muslim states in 1988 was only $833bn., or $896 per person.[192]

Debt. According to figures of the IDB, the debt of the 44 IDB members continued to rise, from $364bn. in 1989, to $376bn. in 1990, to $409bn. in 1991. Debt service rose from 19.1% of their combined GDPs in 1989, to 19.3% in 1990, to 20.2% in 1991. Both oil and nonoil producers saw a rapid expansion of debt.[193]

Trade. While other regional blocs increased the proportion of their internal trade, the Muslim world remained overwhelmingly dependent on the West for exports and imports. In 1990, of $236bn. in exports from Muslim states (mostly oil), only $20bn. (8.4%) went to other Muslim states. Of $209bn. in imports, only $20bn. (9.5%) came from Muslim states.[194] In other words, the total intraregional trade of the Muslim world stood at less than 10%, and had probably dropped slightly over the previous decade. Half of this paltry trade was in oil and gas, most of the rest in other raw materials. Elsewhere in the world, proportions of total intraregional trade were much higher, and rose steadily between 1980 and 1989: from 51% to 59% in Europe, 33% to 37% in East Asia, and 32% to 36% in North America.[195] These regions formed increasingly effective trade blocs, while the Muslim world remained locked in a cycle of dependency on the West.

Agriculture. Of 200m. hectares of arable land in Islamic lands, only a quarter was under cultivation. There was only one tractor per 167 hectares, compared to one per 12 hectares in France.[196]

Education and Literacy. According to a report by the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Isesco), an ICO subsidiary, Muslim illiteracy worldwide stood at about 51% for all age groups over 15 (1990 figures). Among males, illiteracy stood at 40%; among females, 61%. In some countries, illiteracy exceeded 85%. The absolute figures were daunting: in the 36 Muslim countries of the Isesco survey, there were 260m. illiterates in 1990. Despite a rapid increase in primary school enrollment, only 45% of Muslim children aged six to eleven attended primary school. In 1990, 46m. children between these ages did not attend school.[197]

Research and Development. In the Muslim world, scientists and technologists employed in research and development numbered about 100 per million inhabitants; the corresponding figure in the developed world was 2,600 per million.[198]

The institutions created by the ICO represented a very modest beginning toward reduced dependence. Trade was a case in point. From the IDB's inception in 1976 through November 1991, it had spent just under $11bn. on 1,450 projects and transactions in 42 member states, with priority given to the agricultural and food sectors. About $8bn. had gone to development projects, $3bn. to trade transactions. A special trade financing program, instituted in the mid-1980s to promote trade among ICO members, had spent only $149m. on 71 transactions involving nine member states.[199] Perhaps a more promising step to increase such trade was the IDB's

Copyrighted material

creation of the Islamic Export Credit and Investment Insurance Scheme, which would reduce the risks of trade among member states by extending export credit insurance. At the IDB's annual meeting, the bank decided to increase its capital to $5.3bn., in accordance with a decision taken at the Dakar Islamic summit in December 1991.[200] Despite these efforts, the proportion of trade among Muslim states as a percentage of total trade had not risen, and had probably declined. In the fields of literacy and education, Isesco adopted a "medium-term plan" for the period 1992–2000, to begin to close the gaps.[201] But massive obstacles stood in the way of its implementation — and the lessening of Muslim scientific and cultural dependence on the West.

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. Djerejian speech, *JT,* 7 June 1992.
2. Interview with Turabi, *al-Sudan al-Hadith,* 8 April — JPRS, 16 June 1992.
3. *MEI,* 10 January 1992.
4. Interview with Turabi, *al-Quds al-'Arabi,* 9 January 1992.
5. Muslim Brotherhood statement of 15 January 1992, signed by Muhammad Hamid Abu al-Nasr, *al-Sha'b* (Cairo), 21 January 1992.
6. *MEI,* 24 January 1992.
7. Ibid.
8. Salah al-Din al-Jurashi in *al-Majalla,* 19 May — JPRS, 14 July; cf. his analysis of prospects of Islamic movements in the Maghrib, *al-Majalla,* 12 August — JPRS, 29 September 1992.
9. Text in *al-Jazira al-'Arabiyya,* June 1992.
10. Judith Miller, "The Challenge of Radical Islam," *Foreign Affairs,* Spring 1993, p. 48.
11. Conference resolutions, *Frontier Post,* 10 February — JPRS, 26 March 1992.
12. *NYT,* 8 April, 11 August 1993.
13. *Filastin al-Muslima,* March 1993.
14. *Filastin al-Muslima,* May 1993. See also account of a Peshawar occasion marking two years since 'Azzam's "martyrdom," *al-'Alam al-Islami,* 27 January 1992.
15. Khurshid Ahmed, quoted by *WP,* 9 July 1993.
16. *NYT,* 11 August 1993.
17. Michael Fischer, *Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 77.
18. Xavier Raufer in *L'Express,* 21 August — JPRS, 9 November 1992.
19. *The Observer,* 16 February; *Hebdo Libere,* 8 July — JPRS, 28 August 1992.
20. *Le Nouvel Observateur,* 13 February 1992.
21. *The Observer,* 16 February; *Hebdo Libere,* 8 July — JPRS, 28 August 1992.
22. *The European,* 27 February — DR, 6 March 1992.
23. *Al-Watan al-'Arabi,* 15 May — JPRS, 27 July 1992.
24. Maj. Gen. Hasan Abu Basha in *Ruz al-Yusuf,* 29 March 1993.
25. *NYT,* 11 August 1993.
26. Interview with Safwat 'Abd al-Ghani, *al-Ahali* (Cairo), 17 June 1992.
27. On the nature of the interconnections, see *WP,* 2 August 1993.
28. For accounts of 'Abd al-Rahman's career and travels, see *New Yorker,* 12 April; *WP,* 9 July; *WSJ,* 1 September 1993.
29. Surveys of Sudanese economy, *MTM,*29 May — JPRS, 10 August 1992; *Country Profile,* Sudan, 1993–94.

Copyrighted material

30. Interview with Turabi, *Misr al-Fatat*, 16 March — DR, 25 March 1992.
31. Interview with Turabi, *Libération,* 17 March — DR, 22 March 1993.
32. Interview with Zandani, *al-Ribat,* 23 June — JPRS, 29 September 1992.
33. Interview with Mashhur, *al-Hayat* (London), 23 August — JPRS, 24 September 1992.
34. Interview with Turabi, *Libération*, 17 March — DR, 22 March 1993. In fact, Ghannushi had been issued a Sudanese passport, which he had obtained following a decision by Sudan's Revolutionary Command Council considering Sudan "the home country of all Muslims and Arabs." But Sudan's justice minister announced that Ghannushi had returned the passport to the Sudanese Embassy in London at the end of December 1991. AFP, 30 December 1991 — DR, 3 January 1992.
35. Interview with Turabi, *al-Sudan al-Hadith,* 8 April — JPRS, 16 June 1992.
36. Interview with Turabi, *al-Safir,* 25 February — DR, 4 March 1993.
37. SUNA, 17 January — DR, 23 January 1993.
38. Interview with Turabi, *al-Quds al-'Arabi,* 9 January — DR, 15 January 1992.
39. SUNA, 1 October — DR, 7 October; AFP, 1 October — DR, 7 October; *al-'Alam* (London), 3 October; *al-Sharq al-Awsat,* 6 October 1992.
40. *ME,* March 1992.
41. *Ruz al-Yusuf,* 30 November — DR, 4 December 1992; *LAT,* 21 July; *WP,* 3 August 1993.
42. Interview with Turabi, *Le Figaro,* 20 March 1992.
43. *LAT,* 21 July 1993.
44. Interview with Bashir, *al-Quds al-'Arabi,* 7 January — DR, 9 January 1992.
45. *LAT,* 21 July 1993.
46. Ibid.
47. *Al-'Ahd,* 13 March; *al-'Alam* (London), 11 April 1992.
48. Interview with Turabi, *Kayhan,* 1 March — DR, 9 March 1993.
49. E.g., *al-Sharq al-Awsat,* 24 February; *al-Wasat,* 9 March 1992.
50. *WSJ,* 18 August 1993.
51. Ibid.
52. Interview with Turabi, *Le Figaro,* 20 March 1992.
53. SUNA, 14 April — DR, 16 April 1992.
54. Interview with Bashir, *al-Hawadith,* 17 April 1992.
55. Interview with 'Ali Sahlul, *al-Ahram,* 13 March — DR, 23 March 1992.
56. Interview with Turabi, *Le Figaro,* 20 March; interview with Bashir, *al-Quds al-'Arabi,* 7 January — DR, 9 January 1992.
57. Interview with Bashir, *al-Quds al-'Arabi,* 7 January — DR, 9 January 1992.
58. Interview with 'Ali Sahlul, *al-Ahram,* 13 March — DR, 23 March 1992.
59. Summary of Iranian reactions, *al-Hilal al-Duwali,* 1 February 1992.
60. *El Moudjahid,* 22 January — JPRS, 18 March 1992.
61. Editorial, *Révolution Africaine,* 16 January — JPRS, 24 February 1992.
62. *MEI,* 24 January 1992.
63. Interview with Madani, *al-'Alam* (London), 25 January 1992.
64. Interview with Taskhiri, *al-'Alam* (London), 10 October 1992.
65. Account of conference and participants, *al-'Alam* (London), 22 February; *al-Hilal al-Duwali,* 16 March 1992.
66. Rafsanjani's speech, IRNA, 29 January — DR, 31 January 1992.
67. Conference resolutions, IRNA, 1 February — DR, 4 February 1992.
68. See also Jean-François Legrain, "La conférence de Téhéran," *Maghreb-Machrek,* No. 134 (October-December 1991), pp. 124–27.
69. Such as the destruction of the Babri Mosque on 6 December by Hindu extremists; *al-'Alam* (London), 19 December 1992.
70. Account of conference, *al-'Alam* (London), 26 September 1992.
71. Interview with Khalifa, *al-'Alam* (London), 24 October 1992.
72. On Dar al-Taqrib, see Werner Ende, "Sunniten und Schiiten im 20. Jahrhundert," *Saeculum,* Vol. 36, No. 203 (1985), pp. 198–99.
73. *Al-Ahram Weekly,* 3 September — JPRS, 20 October 1992.
74. *Al-Watan al-'Arabi,* 23 October 1992.
75. Interview with Nazzal, *al-Watan al-'Arabi,* 30 October 1992.

Copyrighted material

76. IRNA, 5 October — DR, 7 October; *Filastin al-Muslima,* November 1992.
77. Hamas-Iran relations analyzed in *al-Watan al-'Arabi,* 23 October 1992.
78. Interview with Nazzal, *al-Watan al-'Arabi,* 30 October; interview with Ibrahim Ghawsha, *Kayhan,* 31 October — DR, 27 November 1992.
79. *Ha'aretz,* 16 December 1992, which includes a full account of the Hamas-Iran relationship.
80. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat,* 20 November 1992.
81. For the background, see Martin Kramer, "Musawi's Game," *New Republic,* 23 March 1992.
82. US Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1992* (Washington, 1993), p. 9. When this claim was questioned, Islamic Jihad released a videotape of the embassy, taken during surveillance before the bombing.
83. Interview with Fadlallah, VoL, 2 May — DR, 5 May 1992.
84. Interview with Fadlallah, *Shu'un al-Awsat,* 14 December 1992.
85. Interview with Tufayli, *Nouveau Magazine,* 11 June 1993, for a concise exposition of his view.
86. Interview with Fadlallah, *Filastin al-Muslima,* April 1993.
87. Interview with Fadlallah, *al-'Ahd,* 17 July 1992 .
88. On the elections, see Joseph Bahout, "Liban: les élections législatives de l'été 1992," *Maghreb-Machrek,* No. 139 (January–March 1993), pp. 53–84.
89. IRNA, 4 March — DR, 5 March; *al-'Ahd,* 6 March — DR, 18 March 1992.
90. Interview with Nasrallah, *al-Safir,* 27 February — DR, 5 March 1992.
91. Interview with Nasrallah, *al-Hayat* (London), 12 March — DR, 17 March 1992.
92. Interview with Nasrallah, Voice of the People, 28 February — DR, 2 March 1992.
93. Ibid.
94. Interview with Nasrallah, *al-Safir,* 27 February — DR, 5 March 1992.
95. Interview with Nasrallah, *al-Watan al-'Arabi,* 11 September 1992.
96. AFP, 13 February — DR, 13 February 1992.
97. *JP,* 16 February 1992.
98. IRNA, 17 February — DR, 19 February 1992.
99. IRNA, 18 February — DR, 20 February 1992.
100. IRNA, 19 February — DR, 20 February; IRNA, 17 June — DR, 19 June 1992.
101. *NYT,* 25 March 1992.
102. *NYT,* 26 March 1992.
103. AP, quoted by *JP,* 29 October 1992.
104. *NYT,* 10 December 1992.
105. R. Tehran, 30 June — DR, 30 June 1992.
106. IRNA, 10 November — DR, 12 November 1992.
107. On Siddiqui, see Richard Askwith, "Britain's Angry Ayatollah," *Observer Magazine,* 30 September 1990.
108. Akbar S. Ahmed, *Postmodernism and Islam: Predicament and Promise* (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 160, 190.
109. Siddiqui's article, *al-Hilal al-Duwali,* 16 March 1992.
110. *Al-Hilal al-Duwali,* 16 December 1991.
111. Account of session, *al-Hilal al-Duwali,* 1, 16 January 1992.
112. Reactions summarized in *al-'Alam* (London), 18 January; *al-Hilal al-Duwali,* 16 February, 16 March 1992.
113. *Al-'Alam* (London), 16 May 1992.
114. Reuters, quoted by *JP,* 5 May 1992.
115. Kho'i obituary, *al-'Alam* (London), 15 August 1992.
116. Interview with Sayyid Majid al-Kho'i, *al-'Alam* (London), 22 August 1992; *al-Shira',* 1 February 1993.
117. Interview with Fadlallah, *al-Sharq al-Awsat,* 11 February 1993.
118. Interview with Fadlallah, *al-Bilad* (Beirut), 26 September 1992.
119. Interview with Fadlallah, *al-Bilad* (Beirut), 19 September 1992.
120. Ibid.
121. Ibid.
122. Interview with Fadlallah, *al-Bilad* (Beirut), 26 September 1992.

Copyrighted material

123. Interview with Fadlallah, *al-Bilad* (Beirut), 19 September 1992.
124. Interview with Fadlallah, *al-Bilad* (Beirut), 26 September 1992.
125. Interview with Shaykh Muhammad Isma'il Khaliq, *al-Bilad* (Beirut), 6 June 1992. Khaliq, who headed the Noble Prophet's Institute for Islamic Law in Beirut, attended the conference.
126. Account of Madrasa, *al-'Alam* (London), 7 November 1992.
127. Resolutions, INA, 20 January — DR, 23 January; account of conference in *al-Sha'b* (Cairo), 4 February 1992.
128. R. Kuwait, 20 January — DR, 23 January 1992.
129. Details on the calendar and its critics in *al-Hayat* (London), 9 June — JPRS, 31 July 1992.
130. See e.g., *al-'Alam al-Islami,* 26 October 1992.
131. *Al-'Alam al-Islami,* 17 February; *al-Tadamun al-Islami,* March 1992.
132. *Al-'Alam al-Islami,* 27 January 1992.
133. *Al-'Alam al-Islami,* 12 October; 2 November 1992.
134. *ME,* April; cf. *al-Tadamun al-Islami,* April; *al-'Alam al-Islami,* 17 August 1992.
135. *Al-'Alam al-Islami,* 27 January 1992.
136. *Al-'Alam al-Islami,* 2 March 1992.
137. Fahd speech, Riyadh TV, 25 January — DR, 4 February 1992.
138. SPA, 28 January — DR, 31 January; *al-'Alam al-Islami,* 3 February 1992.
139. *Al-'Alam al-Islami,* 20 January 1992.
140. Reelection and details on Nasif, *al-'Alam al-Islami,* 3 February 1992.
141. Interview with Marzuq, *'Aqidati* (Cairo), 30 March — JPRS, 25 May 1993.
142. *Al-'Alam al-Islami,* 26 October; 2, 12 November; *al-Ahram,* 29 October 1992. On the council, see *MECS* 1988, p. 180; 1989, pp. 185–86. On the same dates, al-Azhar convened the 12th conference of the Academy of Islamic Research. It had last met in 1988, when it first established the International Council for Da'wa and Relief; see *MECS* 1988, p. 179.
143. *Al-'Alam al-Islami,* 12 January, 17 August 1992.
144. *Paris Match,* 23 January 1992.
145. SPA, 29 April — DR, 30 April; *al-Majalla,* 6 May; SPA, 12 May — DR, 13 May; *al-'Alam al-Islami,* 18 May 1992.
146. *Al-'Alam* (London), 9 May 1992.
147. For more on the episode, see *NYT,* 14 May; *Shihan,* 16 May 1992 (which also claims that Iran first offered to undertake the restoration work, an offer Jordan also refused).
148. *NYT,* 21 May; *JT,* 21 May 1992.
149. SPA, 21 June — DR, 23 June 1992.
150. *Al-Tadamun al-Islami,* August 1992.
151. Details of renovation, *Ha'aretz,* 4 August; *al-'Alam* (London), 15 August 1992.
152. *Al-Jazira al-'Arabiyya,* July; *Sourakia,* 6 July 1992.
153. *JP,* 14, 18 May 1992.
154. MENA, 16 May — DR, 18 May; *al-'Alam al-Islami,* 25 May 1992.
155. *Ma'ariv,* 13 May 1992.
156. R. Tehran, 5 May — JPRS, 22 May; *al-'Alam* (London), 16 May 1992.
157. Khomeyni's speech, *Resalat,* 6 May — DR, 1 June 1992.
158. IRNA, 7 June — DR, 10 June 1992.
159. Rafsanjani's speech, R. Tehran, 12 June — DR, 15 June 1992.
160. SPA, 8 June — DR, 9 June 1992.
161. Rafsanjani's speech, Voice of the Islamic Republic, 12 June — DR, 15 June 1992.
162. *Al-'Alam* (London), 25 July 1992.
163. IRNA, 28 May — DR, 29 May 1992.
164. JANA, 29 May — DR, 1 June 1992.
165. Ibid.
166. R. Tripoli, 8 June — DR, 9 June 1992.
167. SPA, 8 June — DR, 9 June 1992.
168. Letter from the Iraqi minister of *awqaf* and religious affairs to Hamid Algabid, INA, 14 June — DR, 15 June 1992.
169. INA, 10 June — DR, 11 June 1992.
170. SPA, 9 June — DR, 10 June 1992.

Copyrighted material

171. *Al-'Alam al-Islami,* 25 May 1992.
172. Tarek Mitri, "La Bosnie-Herzégovine et la solidarité du monde arabe et islamique," *Maghreb-Machrek,* No. 139 (January-March 1993), pp. 123–36.
173. IRNA, 31 May — DR, 2 June 1992.
174. Anatolia, 17 June — DR, 17 June 1992.
175. Text of resolutions, IRNA, 19 June — DR, 22 June 1992.
176. Interview with Velayati, R. Tehran, 19 August — DR, 19 August 1992.
177. Quoted by AFP, 5 December — DR, 9 December 1992.
178. IRNA, 24 September — DR, 24 September 1992.
179. IRNA, 11 November — DR, 13 November 1992.
180. IRNA, 1 December — DR, 2 December 1992.
181. Fahd speech, *al-Sharq al-Awsat,* 2 December; Saudi TV, 1 December — DR, 2 December 1992.
182. *Al-Hayat* (London), 3 December 1992.
183. Resolutions, SPA, 3 December — DR, 4 December; *'Ukaz,* 4 December; *al-Hayat* (London), 4 December; *al-'Alam al-Islami,* 7 December 1992.
184. Accounts of the volunteers, *NYT,* 14 November, 5 December; *Jerusalem Report,* 5 November 1992.
185. Tony Borden in *MEI,* 25 September 1992.
186. *NYT,* 5 December 1992.
187. SPA, 5 June — DR, 8 June 1992.
188. SPA, 7 June — DR, 9 June 1992.
189. *Al-'Alam al-Islami,* 17 August 1992.
190. *NYT,* 5 December 1992.
191. E.g., the editorial in *Sawt al-Sha'b,* 17 June 1992.
192. Figures from *Filastin al-Muslima,* February 1992.
193. IDB reports quoted in *al-Ahram al-Duwali,* 2 March 1992.
194. Ibid.
195. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs,* Summer 1993, p. 27.
196. Figures from *Filastin al-Muslima,* February 1992.
197. Account of Isesco report, *al-Sharq al-Awsat,* 25 December 1991.
198. Isesco figures, *L'Opinion,* 12 January — JPRS, 31 January 1992.
199. Report of speeches by Ahmad Muhammad 'Ali, IDB president, *al-Riyad,* 1 January; *al-Ahram al-Duwali,* 2 March 1992.
200. *ME,* March 1992. Ahmad Muhammad 'Ali was also reappointed to a third successive term as IDB president, a move criticized by supporters of change in the IDB.
201. Details of plan, *L'Opinion,* 12, 13 January — JPRS, 31 January 1992.

Copyrighted material